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Abstract
China's personnel contributions to United Nations peace operations has
significantly increased in the first decade of the twenty-first century, however little
academic or policy attention has been given to examining patterns of Chinese
participation. Most current literature examines China's voting behavior on peace
operations in the UN Security Council.
This thesis employs a research design that combines quantitative and qualitative
approaches to assess the drivers behind China's personnel contributions to peace
operations. Specifically, the thesis examines the factors that lead China to deploy large
contingents of peacekeepers to some missions and smaller numbers or none to others. The
thesis posits that China's personnel contributions will be higher in peace operations taking
place in states that have a high strategic value to China. That is, the peace operation host
state is important to China because of the presence of natural resources, Chinese
investment, diplomatic interests, or a variety of other factors. The thesis finds that China's
participation in peace operations after 2000 is guided by a realist motivation that seeks to
maximize access to commercial and diplomatic interests, with higher levels of
participation in states with high strategic values. Prior to 2000, fewer Chinese personnel
were deployed to peace operations, and the states where they were deployed often had
little strategic value to China. These findings suggest that the calculus behind China's
peace operations participation, and perhaps China's foreign policy, shifted from
improving China's international image to supporting China's economic and diplomatic
development.
Understanding China's participation in peace operations is important as it may
shed light on broader concepts in Chinese foreign and military policy. An enhanced
understanding of the motivations guiding China's participation may provide academics
and policymakers with deeper insight into Chinese foreign policy that may help shape
future interaction with the People's Republic of China.
Thesis Supervisor: M. Taylor Fravel
Title: Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science
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UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
UN Organizational Mission in the DRC
UN Office of Military Affairs
UN Operation in Burundi
UN Operation in Mozambique
Peacekeeping operation
People's Liberation Army (People's Republic of China)
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United Nations
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UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
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UN Interim Administration in Kosovo
UN Mission in Liberia
UN Mission in the Sudan
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UN Truce Supervision Organization
Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau
Mission Country: The primary unit of analysis in this thesis. Many UN operations occur
in more than one state, resulting in multiple mission countries for each operation. For
instance two mission-countries make up the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia
is viewed as one mission country and Eritrea is treated as a separate case. This both
expands the universe of cases and allows for the explanatory variable to be coded for each
peace operation host state instead of being averaged across multiple mission countries.
Introduction and Summary Findings
"The major powers are withdrawing from the peacekeeping role....
China felt it is the right time for us to fill this vacuum.
We want to play our role. "
-Wang Guangya
China's Permanent Representative to the UN
Introduction
China's personnel contributions to United Nations peace operations have
drastically increased since Beijing deployed its first two military observers to the Middle
East in 1990. Between 2000 and 2008 alone, the number of Chinese forces supporting
United Nations operations jumped from just 53 to over 2000, with Chinese observers,
troops and police deployed on missions throughout the world. Although China's
contributions still represent only a fraction of the total United Nations peace operations
force, China's increased participation has garnered the attention of policymakers and
analysts, some who view China's peacekeeping as one method of expanding Beijing's
international access and influence.1 Despite the policy implications of China's
international development, and subsequent academic attention, no published research
examines the strategic rationale for China's participation in peace operations. Existing
literature concentrates on the various political considerations that have led to expanded
Chinese participation in United Nations peace operations, but does not attempt to explain
the relationship between realist strategic factors like the presence of natural resources in a
peace operations host state and China's deployment of peacekeepers there.
This thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature by asking the question: what
factors drive China's participation in United Nations peace operations? Is China
1 J. Peter Pham, "Pandas in the Heart of Darkness: Chinese Peacekeepers in Africa," World Defense Review.
25 October 2007. Available online http://worlddefensereview.com/phaml02507.shtml.
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motivated by protecting markets for Chinese goods, securing access to natural resources,
and developing its own sphere of influence? Or do these realist considerations have little
to do with China's peace operation participation calculus? This thesis examines China's
participation by first clarifying a realist explanatory theory for China's peace operations
contributions and then tests the theory empirically. The theory posited in this work
suggests that China's personnel contributions to a given United Nations peace operation
are positively related to the strategic value of the mission host state, which is measured
using indicators for resource wealth, economic ties with China, and other security or
influence based indicators. The theory is derived from western analysis of China's
growing international roles and further developed by integrating concepts from Chinese
government documents and publications by Chinese academics. This theory is then tested
using a unique triangulation method that includes statistical analysis, medium-N analysis,
and case studies, which allows for a study of both general trends and causal linkages.
Given the lack of complete information and the role of individual decision making elites
in the policy process, it is virtually impossible for an academic study to capture all of the
factors that may influence China's peacekeeping policy. Thus, this thesis examines peace
operation participation using factors that have been discussed as drivers of China's foreign
policy in existing literature.
The theory proposed in this thesis has substantial relevance in both international
relations and policymaking, and spans across the subfields of international relations,
security studies, and international political economy. While peace operations are a
relatively minor activity in the realm of international security, China's increasing
participation is notable for a variety of reasons that make the issue worthy of study. First,
the decision by a nation to put its military and police personnel in harm's way sheds light
on a state's interests.2 A government will likely deploy its service members to a
potentially hostile environment only if their presence will serve some interest of the
deploying state.3 Second, studying China's participation in peace operations enhances
academic understanding of China's foreign and military policies. Although the Chinese
government has made significant progress in increasing transparency in recent years,
many military issues are still cloaked in secrecy. While information about Chinese
military assistance, training exercises, and deployments is generally scarce, the location,
number, and types of personnel China deploys on United Nations peace operations is
publicly available through the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This
information can be examined along with other publicly available information to allow
outsiders to investigate Chinese foreign policy motivations. Third, identifying the strategic
considerations that guide China's peacekeeping calculus will help researchers and
policymakers better understand why China deploys its peacekeeping forces. This deeper
understanding potentially allows for prediction of China's participation in future peace
operations, although predicting and explaining interventions is admittedly a difficult task
that lacks parsimony.4
Summary Findings
The statistical analysis, medium-N analysis, and case studies all indicate that
China's participation in United Nations peace operations in the twenty-first century is
2 China understands the risks involved with deploying its forces on peace operations. Eight Chinese soldiers
have been killed in the line of duty and many others have been injured since China began its peace operation
participation in 1990. See Su Qiang and Le Tian, "Peacekeeping - a rising role for China's PLA" China
Daily. 24 July 2007.
3 Benjamin Miller, "The Logic of U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary
Security Policy,. 19, No. 3 (December 1998), 81.
4 For a discussion on the lack of parsimony in predicting interventionism, see Andrew Bennett, Condemned
to Repetition? (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999): 39-40.
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guided by China's desire to enhance its global diplomatic and commercial access as part
of China's peaceful development. Strategic drivers such as the presence of oil reserves,
trade, and the ability to exert diplomatic influence in a peace operation host state tend to
result in the deployment of Chinese peacekeepers. Although the statistical analysis fails to
produce substantive and significant findings, it does identify trends of larger personnel
contributions to missions in states with higher strategic values. The medium-N analysis,
however, finds that potential strategic drivers are absent from many of the states where
China deploys peacekeepers prior to 2000, suggesting that China had a different rationale
for peace operations participation during that period. Additionally, the analysis finds that
pre-2000 deployments consist primarily of military observers while significantly larger
post-2000 contributions include troops and police in addition to military observers. These
findings imply that China's post-2000 participation may be driven by a realpolitik
motivation aimed at securing access to commercial or diplomatic interests in a peace
operation host state, while pre-2000 participation was based less on strategic drivers than
on a desire to demonstrate that China was a responsible actor in the international
community.
Overview
The first chapter of this thesis offers a brief historical discussion of China's
participation in UN peace operations. Historical accounts combined with primary sources
such as media reports and speeches provide readers with an overview of China's past and
current interventions. This overview outlines the missions in which China has deployed its
peace operations forces and discusses the changing composition of these forces over time.
The second chapter reviews existing literature on general peace operations theory and
China-specific peace operations theory and provides the foundation for the alternate
theory for China's contributions to UN peace operations. The realist theory is presented in
Chapter Three and is informed by western and Chinese academic and policy literature on
China's "peaceful development" and Chinese government white papers. The fourth
chapter describes the methodological approach of the empirical analysis. It presents the
research design and includes a discussion of this project's scope conditions and identifies
key variables, variable measures, data sources, and case selection for each component of
the triangulation method. The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters discuss the findings of the
statistical analysis, medium-N study, and case studies, respectively. Both the medium-N
analysis and case studies offer a more nuanced examination of causal mechanisms that
explain the trends found by regression analysis in chapter five. The eighth and final
chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis and offers policy implications for the
international community and pathways for future research.
Chapter One
A Brief History of China's Participation in UN Peace Operations
The People's Republic of China joined the United Nations in 1971 but avoided
voting for, or participating in peace operations, which it viewed as an infringement on the
sovereignty of states. This position was largely fueled by China's "victim mentality"
complex in which China viewed itself as being the target of great power aggression and
exploitation.5 China argued that their position was consistent with the UN Charter, which
states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."6 China also
feared that UN peace operations would set the stage for further intervention by world
powers. Huang Hua, China's first delegate to the United Nations after Beijing regained its
seat in 1971 believed that peace operations such as the United Nations Emergency Force
would bring "infinite evil consequences in its wake and pave the way for further
international intervention in the Middle East with superpowers as behind the scene
bosses." 7 Additionally, resource constraints limited China's potential participation in
peace operations during this time. Throughout the 1970s, China's resources were allocated
to providing defensive capabilities against a possible attack from the Soviet Union as well
as delivering aid to the Third World.8
5 Yin He, China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations (Stockholm: Institute for Security and
Development Policy, 2007): 17.6 Chapter 1, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter cited in Gary D. Rawnsley, "May You Live in Interesting Times:
China, Japan and Peacekeeping," Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the
Challenges of Military Intervention, ed. By Rachel Utley (London: Ashgate, 2006).
7 S. Kim, China, the United Nations and the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) cited in
Rawnsely 2006.
8 Yin 2007: 19.
Over time, however, China shifted its position on peace operations from non-
voting and principled opposition to voting with principled opposition through abstention.
Vetoing missions could have compromised China's relations with Third World countries
by obstructing missions that could potentially help them, while voting in favor of missions
could compromise China's positions on state sovereignty and non-intervention. 9 In 1981,
China voted for the first time to support a peacekeeping force when it supported the
extension of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. China justified this
decision by arguing that a strengthened United Nations was critical as the international
situation became more tumultuous and unstable. l0 The Third Plenary Session of the
Eleventh National Conference of the Communist Party of China in 1978 had adopted a
policy of opening up and reform, which led to greater engagement in international issues
and multilateral diplomacy." Despite its growing support of UN peace operations, China
did not deploy its forces on peace operations until 1990. As with earlier periods, China's
actions were constrained by resource limitations. Throughout the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping
focused China's development on economic reforms, allocating most resources for
economic development, leaving little funding for contributions to peace operations. 12
By 1990, China had been admitted to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping
and had deployed its first military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision in
the Middle East. China's first deployment of military units on a peace operation occurred
between April 1992 and September 1993 when China sent a total of 800 engineering
troops to the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia.
9 Ibid, 19-20.
10 "UN Should Play a More Effective Role," Beijing Review. 1 November 1982, 11-12 cited in Rawnsely
2006.
"' Yin 2007: 21.
12 Deng Xiaoping, "We Shall Concentrate on Economic Development" cited in Yin 2007: 22.
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TABLE 1: UN Peace Operations Since 1990
Mission Mission Date China Date
UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization 1948- 1990-
UNMOGIP: UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 1949-
UNFICYP: UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 1964-
UNDOF: UN Disengagement Force 1974-
UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon 1978- 2006-
UNGOMAP: UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 1988-1990
UNIIMOG: UN Iran-Iraq Mil Observer Group 1988-1991
UNAVEM I: UN Angola Verification Mission I 1989-1991
UNTAG: UN Transition Assistance Group 1989-1990
ONUCA: UN Observer Group in Central America 1989-1992
UNIKOM: UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission 1991-2003 1991-2003
MINURSO: UN Mission for the Referedum in Western Sahara 1991- 1991-
UNAVEM II: UN Angola Verification Mission II 1991-1995
ONUSAL: UN Observer Mission in El Salvador 1991-1995
UNAMIC: UN Advance Mission in Cambodia 1991-1992
UNPROFOR: UN Protection Force 1992-1995
UNTAC: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 1992-1993 1992-1993
UNOSOM I: UN Operation in Somalia I 1992-1993
ONUMOZ: UN Operation in Mozambique 1992-1994 1993-1994
UNOSOM II: UN Operation in Somalia II 1993-1995
UNOMUR: UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 1993-1994
UNOMIG: UN Observer Mission in Georgia 1993-
UNOMIL: UN Observer Mission in Liberia 1993-1997 1993-1997
UNMIH: UN Mission in Haiti 1993-1996
UNAMIR: UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 1993-1996
UNASOG: UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group 1994-1994
UNMOT: UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan 1994-2000
UNAVEM III: UN Angola Verification Mission III 1995-1997
UNCRO: UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia 1995-1996
UNPREDEP: UN Preventive Deployment Force 1995-1999
UNMIBH: UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-2002
UNTAES: UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Branja, and
Western Sirium 1996-1998
UNMOP: UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka 1996-2002
UNSMIH: UN Support Mission in Haiti 1996-1997
MINUGUA: UN Verification Mission in Guatemala 1997-1997
MONUA: UN Observer Mission in Angola 1997-1999
UTMIH: UN Transition Mission in Haiti 1997-1997
MINOPUH: UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti 1997-2000
UN Cvilian Police Support Group 1998-1998
MINURCA: UN Mission in the Central African Republic 1998-2000
UNOMSIL: UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 1998-1999 1998-1999
UNMIK: UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 1999- 2004-
UNAMSIL: UN Mission in Sierra Leone 1999-2005 1999-2005
UNTAET: UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 1999-2002 2000-2002
MONUC: UN Organization Mission in the DRC 1999- 2001-
UNMEE: UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000-2008 2000-2008
UNMISET: UN Mission in Support in East Timor 2002-2005 2002-2005
UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia 2003- 2003-
UNOCI: UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire 2004- 2004-
MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 2004- 2004-
ONUB: UN Operation in Burundi 2004-2006 2004-2006
UNMIS: UN Mission in the Sudan 2005- 2005-
UNMIT: UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 2006- 2006-
UNAMID: AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur 2007- 2007-
MINURCAT: UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 2007-
Note:Missions with no end date are ongoing as of December 2008.
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The number of Chinese forces deployed on peace operations decreased after that with
China concentrating on smaller deployments of observers and civilian police officers
rather than formed military units."3 However the start of the 2 1st century marked a
significant shift in China's contributions to UN peace operations. China drastically
increased its contributions to peace operations, and the composition of China's
contributions shifted from military observers to police and military units. Graph 1, above,
displays the deployment of Chinese and United Nations forces from 2000 to 2008 and
Table 1, above displays the missions where China has deployed forces since 1990. As of
December 2008, China had more than 2000 personnel deployed on UN peace operations
throughout the world, a majority of which serve in Africa.
Another significant trend in China's peace operations contributions is a shift in the
type of personnel China deploys on UN missions. Graph 2, below, displays the shift from
unarmed military observers and civilian police to military troops that has occurred since
2000. Although China generally deploys engineering, transportation, and medical military
units rather than combat forces like infantry, the presence of formed military units is likely
more visible in the host state and may enable China to influence the host state
government.
The quantitative increase in forces, the shift in Chinese peace force composition,
and potential policy implications makes this currently understudied area well-suited for
research that attempts to explain how Beijing decides where to deploy its peace forces.
13 Troop contributions for missions dating back to 1990 are available online from the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations. Available online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/factsfigs.shtml>.
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Chapter Two
Review of Existing Literature Review
Despite a sizeable body of literature on United Nations peace operations and
China's growing global influence, existing literature does not explain the link between
strategic drivers of China's rise and its participation in United Nations peace operations.
Current literature on the rise of China focuses primarily on military modernization and
expanded ties with the developing world, largely neglecting the role of peace operations.
The limited literature that does touch upon the area focuses largely on assessing China's
PKO participation based on China's acceptance of international norms and the mandate of
a mission, rather than on the strategic considerations that may influence China to
participate in certain PKOs while refraining from deploying personnel in others.
Additionally, the body of literature on peace operations today is generally concentrated on
analyzing mission effectiveness and focuses on policymaking rather than drawing
connections to international relations theory. This thesis attempts to address both policy
and theory by drawing on IR theory and empirical and case study analysis to explain
China's peacekeeping policies.
Chinese peacekeeping practitioners suggest that China's policy toward
participation in the UN peacekeeping regime is guided by China's national interests and
comprehensive national capabilities-in other words, its grand strategy. 14 China's
participation in UN peace operations increases its influence both in the United Nations and
in weak regions of the world, where China's presence in peacekeeping missions may
14 Yin, 2007: 14.
discourage Taiwan from using financial incentives to gain diplomatic recognition. 15
Active participation in peace operations also lessens the fear of a potential China threat by
projecting an image of China as a responsible actor to the governments of both developing
and developed nations.'16  Participation also balances against the United States by
promoting multilateralism in international security efforts.'7 Deploying peacekeeping
personnel also allows China's military and police forces to gain first-hand experience at a
very low cost.18
Since the end of the Cold War there have been fifty-four UN peace operations, of
which China has participated in twenty-two. The expansion of UN peace operations has
increased the UN's demand for trained troops, civilian police, and military observers.
However, since the UN does not maintain a standing army, it must solicit contributions of
personnel and equipment from member states. To do this, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations considers factors such as geographic balance, political neutrality
and past peacekeeping record of various member states, and drafts a list of potential
contributors. 19 Member states then make the decision on whether to participate.
Two competing arguments attempt to explain states participation in peace
operations. The first suggests that states peacekeep not for out of state level motivations
reasons, but instead do so in the interest of the international community. This idealist view
suggests that peacekeeping participation transcends self-interested national objectives and
argues that states will participate in UN peacekeeping missions out of an obligation to
15 Drew Thompson, "Beijing's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations," China Brief 5, No 11. (May
2005)
16 Yin, 2007: 11.
'7 Yin, 2007: 11.
18 Thompson, 2007.
19 Hisako Shimura, "The Role of the UN Secretariat in Organizing Peacekeeping," in United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2001):
50-52.
preserve peace and international norms, even when doing so conflicts with national
interests. 20 The realist argument, on the other hand, posits that states participate in the UN
peacekeeping regime out of self-interest.21 Participation in UN peace operations allows a
state to protect or attain its current or desired position in the international system or to
benefit from access to a set of private goods. Realist drivers for China include balancing
against the power of the United States, improving China's power projection, building
China's international influence, and securing access to critical private goods such as
energy resources.22 As discussed earlier, this thesis tests the realist theory behind China's
peacekeeping participation.
If China's peacekeeping policy is driven by realist motivations, it should not
participate in peace operations purely for altruistic reasons. China selectively engages in
peace operations, choosing to participate in missions that are in line with China's grand
strategy and promote China's interests. 23 Miller (1998) cites intrinsic interests including
the geostrategic importance of the region, the economic resources located there, and the
importance of the region for trade and investments as factors that drive a state to
intervene. 24 Extrinsic interests are based on the geographical proximity of the potential
intervention host state and the intervening power.2 5 Boulding (1962) offers the concept of
a "loss of strength gradient" in which states receive a lower marginal utility from
20 Doxey, 1989 cited in. Laura Neack, "UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self," Journal of
Peace Research 32 (May 1995): 183.
21Ibid: 181-196
22 Yin, 2007: 11.
23 Yin, 2007: 14.
24 Benjamin Miller, "The Logic of U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary
Security Policy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 1998): 81.
25 Ibid: 82. Although Miller focuses on interventions by the United States, general concepts are applicable to
actors other than the United States.
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dominating a region that is farther from an intrinsically important state. 26 Miller argues
that although extrinsic interests are important, intrinsic interests are the most vital form of
interests to the potential intervener as they have the potential to affect the global balance
of power. States that lack extrinsic and intrinsic interests are considered to be low-interest
regions as they are far from the hegemon and lack geostrategic and economic importance.
While a state may intervene in regions that lack intrinsic or extrinsic value to defend its
international reputation, the intervention is likely to be limited at most. Norms and idealist
interests however can be used to legitimize more realist interventions that are designed to
secure and protect intrinsic and extrinsic interests. 27
Participation in peace operations can also provide China with a variety of private
goods such as access to natural resources, diplomatic influence, and markets for produced
goods. Bobrow and Boyer (1997) find that through peacekeeping large powers may gain
access to conducive economic and commercial conditions, increased national status,
training benefits from military participation in a peace operation, and reimbursement in
hard currency for troops.28 Neack (1995) suggests that many nations peacekeep to spread
or maintain their spheres of influence. For instance, the United States discouraged UN
peacekeeping in Central American and the Caribbean until the late 1980s in order to
minimize foreign influence in the region.29 China's personnel contributions to
peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and East Timor may be explained by Beijing's
26 Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962): 245-247. Also
cited in Miller, 1998: 81.
27 Miller, 1998: 81-86.
28 Davis B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer, "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping
Operations." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (December 1997): 727.
29 Neack, 1995: 189.
desire to increase its regional influence, while more recent missions in Africa may reflect
China's growing interest in a region currently outside the influence of any major power.
Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin build on the regional influence explanation for
participating in peace operations. While Bellamy and his co-authors explain why an
individual state would act unilaterally, as a pivotal actor, in a peace operation, their theory
may also explain why a state chooses to participate in peace operations carried out by an
international organization. First, regional hegemons may take part in peacekeeping in
order to "press their own claims to territory, economic benefits or access to natural
resources, or support the socio-political ambitions of allies." Second, concerned neighbors
might intervene as pivotal states when internal conflict occurs in their own backyard to
prevent a spill-over effect that could decrease regional stability. Lastly, great powers
might act as pivotal states in initiating and leading peace operations in order to that help
maintain their position in the international status quo.30
In addition to the private goods gained through peace operations participation,
Bobrow and Boyer suggest that peacekeeping is an "impure public good" that provides
states with additional benefits. Peace operations meet the traditional definition of a public
good in that peacekeeping is non-excludable; all nations can participate and benefit from
peacekeeping. However, unlike traditional public goods like those defined by Mancur
Olson, peacekeeping is impure because certain states receive a higher level of benefit, and
are therefore more likely to participate when there is a higher level of benefit associated
with participation than with non-participation.31 While all states theoretically benefit from
the lower levels of violence that can follow successful peace operations, states with
30 Alex J Bellamy et. al., Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004): 36
31 Bobrow and Boyer, 1997: 725-727.
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greater economic or political interests in a peace operation host nation have the potential
to earn a higher payoff from the stability in that country. Thus, according to this theory
stability serves as both an idealist and realist motivator that promotes international norms
of human rights while facilitating commercial and economic development for the
intervening power.
China's growing participation in international and regional organizations has been
explained as part of China's attempts to become a responsible actor in international
society. China initially opposed many international organizations, which it viewed as
being controlled by the two Cold War superpowers. 32 China's conception of these
organizations has changed drastically since the establishment of the People's Republic of
China. Initially, China did not meet all the criteria required of a responsible actor in the
global community, which include good governance, willingness to engage in humanitarian
intervention, and the protection of human rights. 33 Over time, however, China attempted
to change its international image, developing diplomatic relations with other states and
playing amore active role in the international community. China's continuing integration
into the international community may lead it to weaken its traditional concept of national
sovereignty. 34
Current literature on China's PKO participation is limited to a handful of articles
that primarily rely on case studies to explain the political and international norm based
considerations of peace operations participation. These articles generally focus on China's
Security Council voting behavior on peace operations, and not on personnel contributions.
32 Rosemary Foot, "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State," The China Journal 45 (January
2001): 6.
33 Ibid: 3.
34 Allen Carlson, "Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China's Recent Stance on Sovereignty
and Multilateral Intervention," Pacific Affairs77 (Spring 2004): 18.
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Historically, China has generally voted for traditional peacekeeping operations and
opposed nontraditional peace enforcement operations. 35 China's rationale for this is
shaped by Beijing's conception of national sovereignty. 36 Chinese leaders fear that United
Nations could become a "supra-national government" that could usurp power from
sovereign states. Thus, China opposed nontraditional peacekeeping, which Beijing viewed
as impinging on state sovereignty by violating the principles of nonviolence, host state
consent to a peace operations, and impartiality of peacekeeping forces.37 China may fear
that voting for in nontraditional PKOs could set a precedent that would allow for foreign
intervention if ethnic violence erupted in minority areas of China like Tibet and
Xinjiang.38 Given these concerns and China's support for state sovereignty, China is
reluctant to participate in or support non-traditional PKOs that fail to uphold this holy
trinity of peacekeeping.
Despite China's strong support for state sovereignty, there has been a transition in
Beijing's attitude in this regard. Gill and Reilly (2000) argue that because of increasing
global economic integration and interdependence, China's notions of state sovereignty
may be made subordinate to advancing China's overall national interests.39 Thus, if China
hopes to improve its "comprehensive national power," it must cooperate with the
international society and modify its views on national sovereignty.40 China has
35 M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989," Asian Survey 36
(November 1996): 1106-1107
36 Bates Gill and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention, and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing,"
Survival 42 (Autumn 2000): 42-43.
37 Fravel, 1996: 1109.
38 Yeshi Choedon, "China's Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy,"
China Report 41 (2005): 54.
39 Gill and Reilly, 2000: 43.
40 Li Shaojun, 'Guoji anquan moshi yu guojia de anquan zhanlue xuanzhe'('National Security Models and
Options for National Security Strategy') Shijiejingli yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), no. 6,
1996, p. 7. cited in Gill and Reilly: 43.
demonstrated a shift in this direction in its peacekeeping policy, particularly in the types of
cases subject to intervention, the acceptable levels of force, and justifiable objectives. 41
Gill and Reilly find substantial evidence for these paradigmatic shifts in China's 1998
White Paper on National Defense. The White Paper suggests that it is not necessary for all
parties in a host state to consent to UN involvement and also does not explicitly exclude
the use of force in peace operations.42 This flexibility enabled China to support and
participate in missions that deviated from traditional peace operations.
Another factor influencing the shift in China's position on peace operations that
has allowed China to participate in a wider spectrum of non-traditional missions is the
evolution of the domestic decision making environment.43 One school of thought is that
China has internalized changes in international norms. Chen (2009) suggests that China's
increased participation in non-traditional peace operations comes as a result of China
internalizing and institutionalizing a shift in international norms that today prioritizes
human rights rather than sovereignty.44 Another complementary theory is that a new cadre
of peacekeeping proponents has emerged within various government ministries in China
and has promoted China's expanded role in peace operations. 45
China has participated in over a dozen peacekeeping and observer missions since it
deployed its first observers in 1989. Of these missions, current literature on China's
peacekeeping participation discusses the same set of examples: Cambodia, East Timor,
41 Gill and Reilly, 2000: 44.
42 China 's National Defense in 1998. (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, 1998) cited in Gates and Reilly, 2000: 44.
43 Gill and Reilly, 2000 and Carlson, 2004 offer variants of this argument.
44 See Jing Chen, "Explaining the Change in China's Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping: A Norm Driven
Perspective" Journal of Contemporary China 18 (2009).
45 See Gill and Reilly, 2000 and Chen, 2009.
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Somalia, and Kosovo. 46 Cambodia is analyzed because it was China's first large scale
deployment of peacekeeping forces. East Timor is a recent example of China's PKO
participation in a traditional peacekeeping environment. Kosovo is used as an example of
a PKO that China viewed as violating the holy trinity of peacekeeping and opposed, and
Somalia is a rare exception where China supported-but did not contribute personnel to-
an operation that was carried out without host nation consent.
In the Cambodian case, China deployed as part of the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC). China deployed 450 personnel including troops and military
observers to help demobilize warring factions, repatriate refugees, and supervise the 1993
national elections. China's leaders praised UNTAC as a highly successful example of
peacefully resolving regional conflicts. Fravel (1996) notes, however, that the image of
UNTAC as a success does not imply China's endorsement of similar operations in other
countries, because UNTAC was not a traditional PKO.4 7 The mission was established with
the consent of the four belligerents and adhered to the principles of non-violence and
peacekeeper neutrality, but it infringed on the sovereignty of the Cambodian government
by assuming many governmental roles. Fravel (1996) argues that China likely participated
to improve its international reputation and regain the trust of Southeast Asian nations after
the Tiananmen Square Massacre. 48 Additional possible explanations not discussed by
Fravel include China's desire to limit instability and project power in its periphery. These
factors could be analyzed as part of this research design because maintaining regional
stability can be considered a strategic objective of a state.
46 See Carlson, Fravel, Gill and Reilly, Choeden.
47 Fravel, 1996: 1110.
48 Fravel,1996: 1109.
Most scholars describe the UN Mission in East Timor as a case where China
played a pivotal role in a PKO, once Indonesian consent was received. China sent election
observers, supported a multinational non-UN force to quell violence, and contributed
civilian police to the UN mission. China cited the humanitarian crisis as one of the
primary reasons why it chose to support a PKO in East Timor, possibly indicating that
China was trying to solidify its position as a responsible regional actor. Scholars further
suggest that the close proximity of the conflict to China influenced China's decision to
undertake an active role in this PKO.49 The proximity of a nation to China should
therefore be considered a factor that contributes to a country's strategic value to China.
China's decision to peacekeep because of the geographic proximity of East Timor to
China in this case helps to emphasize the realist nature of China's peacekeeping.
On the other hand, China was strongly opposed to the UN mission in Kosovo
because it viewed the conflict as a domestic one. China fears that intervening in domestic
disputes could lead other powers to threaten to intervene in internal Chinese disputes.
China's opposition to the intervention in the Kosovo conflict grew when NATO bypassed
the Security Council and launched air strikes against Serbian targets. In the eyes of
China's policy makers, this operation violated all elements of the peacekeeping trinity. It
violated the sovereignty of a state, relied on military force, and lacked neutrality because it
bypassed the UN Security Council.5o
China's decision to support peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in
Somalia was a departure from the traditional Chinese position to avoid PKOs that violated
the trinity of peacekeeping. Choeden (2005) notes that the use of force to try to establish
49 Gill and Reilly, 2000: 48.
50 Gill and Reilly, 2000:47.
peace was an 'exceptional action.' China justified Chinese support for this mission by
suggesting that there was no violation of state sovereignty since there was no stable
government in place at the time of the peacekeeping operation.51 After the operation,
Chinese UN representatives argued that the most effective way to settle conflict is through
peaceful means.52
China's participation or non-participation in recent peace operations is explained
in current literature largely as the result of the political or norms characteristics of the
peacekeeping mission. This explanation appears to assume that China's policy makers are
only concerned with promoting state sovereignty or international norms, and not with
broader strategic factors. Yet such an assumption seems to contradict the theory that
China's participation in international peacekeeping is a critical component of China's
economic development and growth and its overall grand strategy.
China's participation in peacekeeping is a constantly evolving field that demands
continual academic attention in order to keep pace with China's expanding and evolving
role. Thus, even though most China-focused literature on peacekeeping was published
within the last decade, much of it is already dated. One key example of this is the 2000
finding that "China has repeatedly used its UN veto to block the implementation of PKOs
in states that established diplomatic ties with Taiwan.53 While China has and still attempts
to block some PKOs in states with diplomatic relations with Taiwan, in 2004, China
deployed one of its most heavily armed peacekeeping forces to Haiti, a country that has
recognized Taipei since 1956. China's participation and support of PKOs in countries with
51 Choeden, 2005: 47.
52 Choeden, 2005: 48.
53 Gill and Reilly, 2000: 46.
ties to Taiwan may indicate a new strategic focus in China's PKO participation policy that
is analyzed in this thesis.
This thesis moves beyond the current literature explaining China's participation in
peacekeeping in several ways. First, it presents a new, yet complementary, theory based
on conventional wisdom that treats China as a realist actor seeking to maximize its global
access and influence through participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Second, this
thesis closely examines the relationship between China's peacekeeping calculus and
strategic drivers such as natural resources and regional security. And third, this thesis
offers the first known quantitative empirical analysis of the peacekeeping participation.
Chapter Three
Theory
There is no question that the current research on China's shift in peacekeeping
policy explains Beijing's willingness to contribute personnel to a wider range of UN
missions. While the current theories offer explanations for the increased potential for
China to participate in peace operations, they do not tell us why China contributes forces
to some missions and not to others. Drawing from Chinese academic and policy
publications and Miller's theories of intrinsic and extrinsic interests, this thesis proposes
an alternative theory for China's peacekeeping contributions. This new theory, which
examines China's peace operations contributions through a realist lens is compatible with
the existing theories. Whereas current theories explain how China justifies participation in
the UN peace operations regime, this new theory explains how China decides to contribute
forces to some missions and not others.
During the 1990s, China appeared to be developing a new security concept where
security included not only military power but also non-military components such as
economic growth and security. 54 In late 2003, Zheng Bijian, the former Vice Principal of
China's Central Party School, built upon this security concept when he defined China's
peaceful rise." The theory argues that despite the historical precedent for conflict during
power transition, China would develop peacefully and cooperate with other countries as it
54 Russell Ong, China's Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era. (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press,
2002), 12-31.
55 In recent years, the phrase peaceful rise has been largely replaced by the phrase peaceful development.
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developed "a new international political and economic order." 56 By late 2004, Chinese
leaders had replaced the term 'peaceful rise' with 'peaceful development.' The shift was
merely a change in terminology designed to better reassure other nations of China's non-
threatening intentions, and the fundamental strategy remained unchanged. 57 The spirit of
China's peaceful development is captured by China's 2005 white paper on its peaceful
development.
While seeking development by relying primarily on its own strength, China
sticks to the policy of opening-up, engages in extensive international economic
and technological cooperation, and shares with all other countries the fruits of
mankind's civilization; respects and gives consideration to others' interests,
works with other countries to solve the disputes and problems cropping up in
cooperation, and strives to achieve mutual benefit and common development;
abides by its international obligations and commitments, actively participates
in international systems and world affairs, and endeavors to play a constructive
and locomotive role. 58
Increased participation in the international community and economic growth are key
components of China's development. Thus, the Communist Party of China has made
economic development its central task, with all their other work subordinate to and
serving this goal. 59 In its development, however, China faces a number of challenges
including securing international trading partners and ensuring access to critical energy
resources to fuel its growth. The Chinese government believes that achieving these goals
is closely tied to both internal and external harmony. 60 This argument is echoed by
56 Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status" Foreign Affairs 84 (September/October
2005), 22-24.
57 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, "The Changing Ecology of Foreign-Policy Making in China: The
Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise,"' The China Quarterly 190 (June 2007): 291-310.
58 China 's Peaceful Development Road, Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, 12 December 2005.
59 Constitution of the Communist Party of China (16th National Congress), Beijing: Foreign Language Press,
2003, 14-15.
60 China 's Peaceful Development Road, Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, 12 December 2005.
Chinese scholars who suggest that China will be unable to concentrate on development
without a peaceful and stable international environment. 61
Additionally, the significant increase in China's peace operation deployments in
the early 2000s coincides with the announcement of China's "going out policy." In 2002,
the Chinese government launched an official campaign urging firms to "go out" and
increase investment overseas. 62 The campaign was initiated partly in response to China's
growing demand for natural resources and raw materials that were needed to fuel China's
domestic modernization and growth. Due to the size of its population and resource
constraints on the Chinese mainland, China was unable to meet these demands through
domestic production. The increase in Chinese peace operations deployments following
the announcement of the going out policy lends additional support to the argument that
China's participation in peace operations is partially motivated by a desire to secure
resource inputs and markets overseas.
Another key component of China's peaceful development is the principle of win-
win cooperation and mutual benefit. 63 According to this ideology, which is based in part
on China's perception of long being exploited and humiliated by imperialist "big powers,"
China will modernize and expand its global power without taking advantage of potential
trade partners. 64 Beijing will expand its market access while also "support[ing]
international efforts to help developing countries to strengthen capacity for independent
61 Pei Yuanying, "China's Diplomatic Strategy and Peaceful Development" China International Studies
(Spring 2006): 123.
63 Aaron L. Friedberg, "Going Out": China's Pursuit of Natural Resources and Implications for the PRC's
Grand Strategy. (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006): 21-24.
63 China's Peaceful Development Road.
64 China's Peaceful Development Road.
development and improv[ing] the lives of their peoples." 65 While current discussion of
win-win cooperation in Chinese and international media has focused primarily on
Chinese-funded public works projects in exchange for resource extraction concessions, the
promise of stability offered by a robust peacekeeping force may be seen as a potential
"win" or benefit for a peace operation host state. In exchange for offering a state the
opportunity for a more stable future, China can benefit from increased trade and resource
access or enhanced diplomatic relations. The quid pro quo exchange of a large Chinese
peacekeeping deployment for diplomatic recognition was demonstrated in 2003 when
China withheld deploying its peacekeepers to the UN Mission in Liberia until that country
broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Elements of China's peaceful development have also been described as part of
China's post-Cold War grand strategy. This speculative grand strategy features four
notional axioms: avoiding conflict, building comprehensive national power, advancing
incrementally, and maintaining stability, defending sovereignty, achieving preeminence,
and pursuing parity. 66 China's participation in peace operations is in line with each of
these four principles. Chinese support of peace operations allows Beijing to avoid direct
conflict with the United States by demonstrating its commitment to becoming a
responsible actor in the international system while avoiding large deployments to focal
points of United States foreign policy, like Southwest Asia.67 Chinese participation in
peace operations also allows China to build its comprehensive national power, a measure
of economic, military, and technological capabilities that Chinese strategists use to
65 Speech by Hu Jintao. In Chinese, at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual
Conference 2008, 12 April 2008. Boao, Hainan, China. Available online: <http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/768675/t4765 1 8.htm>.
66 Friedberg, 2006: 6.
67 The large deployment of Chinese peacekeeping forces to Lebanon in 2006 is an exception to the rule.
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measure the relative strength of nations. 68 Deploying peacekeepers improves military
readiness by offering hands-on training to Chinese peacekeeper and allows them to test
their skills and equipment in an operational environment. Chinese participation in peace
operations also provides China with a means to incrementally advance its global status.
An analyst at the Central Party School, the high-level institution which trains Chinese
Communist Party officials, suggested that the post-September 1 1 h environment has
created a period of strategic opportunity for China as the United States focuses on waging
the Global War on Terrorism. According to the Central Party School analyst, China must
use this opportunity to improve US-Sino relations and "create favorable conditions for the
creation of an external environment for China after the 'period of strategic opportunity."' 69
Part of creating a favorable 'external environment,' includes building diplomatic and
economic ties. In recent years, China has used the promise of providing peacekeeping
forces to gain diplomatic recognition from peace operation host states, such as Liberia,
which broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan after China threatened to withhold deploying
peacekeepers to the UN Mission in Liberia.70 Participating in peace operations also allow
China to ensure a favorable international environment, thereby maintaining stability.
Participation in peace operations is therefore very much in accord with China's
peaceful development and the overall national strategy of China given Beijing's desire for
growth and the necessity for a stable international environment to enable the country's
rise. China's 2005 peaceful development white paper stresses the importance of
participating in a "new security concept...to safeguard world peace, security and stability"
68 Friedberg, 2006: 14-15.
69 Jianfei Liu, "The 'Period of Strategic Opportunity' and Sino-US Ties," Beijing Liaowang (in Chinese)
trans. In FBIS CPP20030207000061, January 20, 2003. cited in Friedberg 2006.
70 China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping. (New York: International Crisis Group, 2009): 18.
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and emphasizes China's growing participation in peacekeeping. 71 By contributing forces
to peace operations, China not only enhances stability and appears to the world as a
responsible actor, but also gains access to the impure public goods and private goods that
Bobrow and Boyer describe as an incentive for peacekeeping participation. China's
participation may allow it to increase its political influence, gain access to new markets or
sources of natural resources, and improve its international reputation by demonstrating its
commitment to international organizations and human rights. Thus, China is able to
integrate both idealist and realist concepts in facets of its peaceful development, including
peace operations participation. 72 China ostensibly pursues an idealist agenda by
promoting a peaceful international environment, but acts as a realist in promoting this
harmonious world so that it can pursue its own national interests.
The theory proposed in this thesis posits that China's peacekeeping contributions
are motivated by ensuring a stable environment in a peace operation host state so that
China can benefit from access to markets, resources, increased influence and soft power
projection. In order to operationalize and test the theory, this thesis treats each peace
operation host state as having a specific strategic value to China. This strategic value is
based on key measurable intrinsic interests, such as trade and the host state's energy
resource endowment, and the extrinsic interest of geographic proximity. The theory
suggests that these interests help shape China's peacekeeping calculus. Academic articles
published by former Chinese diplomats and policymakers capture this sentiment. Pei
Yuanying, a former Chinese ambassador to India and Poland, suggests that "Diplomatic
strategy requires distinguishing between core interests, important interests and general
71 China 's Peaceful Development Road.
72 Yu Xintian, "Harmonious World and China's Road of Peaceful Development" China International
Studies (Spring 2007), 15.
interests, between immediate interests and long-term interests, and between local interests
and overall interests. The core interests, long-term interests and overall interests of our
country should be the starting point and end result of our foreign policy."73
Based on the theory posited above, this thesis hypothesizes that China is a realist
actor that is likely to deploy a larger number of personnel to peace operations in countries
that are more economically or diplomatically valuable to China, either now or in the
foreseeable future. Arguably every UN member state is diplomatically important to China
because of their votes at the UN. The importance China places on winning the support of
these states is made clear by Beijing's recent diplomatic and economic overtures to small,
resource scarce states.74 While China has provided developmental assistance and
diplomatic recognition to these states, China will likely be more willing to deploy
personnel to a state where they will receive a larger payoff than a UN vote. Deploying
peace operations forces helps to establish regional stability, which may be a precondition
to accessing markets or resource concessions. In addition to increased stability, a force
contributor may hope to enhance their relation with the government of the peace operation
host state. The large-N, medium-N, and case study analysis attempts to address this
hypothesis and causal mechanisms.
73Pei,2006: 122.




The relative paucity of data related to China's participation in peace operations
leads to the use of a triangulated research design to test the realist theory proposed in this
thesis. 75 The limited availability of complete data on China's personnel contributions to
UN peace operations combined with missing data on key indicators of the explanatory
variable makes a large-N analysis alone a weak test for the theory proposed by this
research. This thesis strengthens this test by triangulating the findings of regression
analysis with a qualitative medium-N analysis and a set of case studies. The large-N
component of the research is designed to capture general trends and relationships between
the strategic value to China of a peace operation host state with the level of China's
participation in the peace operation in the given state. The medium-N analysis seeks to
clarify causal mechanisms by more closely examining the various indicators of the
explanatory variables, while the case studies allow for closer examination of details in
significant cases of Chinese participation. The analysis conducted in this thesis is
organized so the large-N analysis provides a general trend, while the following two forms
of analysis provide a greater level of detail and insight.
The universe of cases for this thesis consists of the fifty-four UN peace operations
that were either ongoing in 1990 or launched since 1990 through December 2008, as listed
75The use of triangulation, while not widely used, does have precedent in academic literature. A recent
example is How Free is "Free Riding" in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action
Problem, Kalyvas and Kocher, 2006. Kalyvas and Kocher rely on a triangulation of anecdotal evidence,
quantitative analysis, and analysis within a regional case study to examine the cost of free riding in civil
wars.
by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008 List of Operations.7 6 This
includes 24 missions where China has contributed forces and 30 missions where China
does not contribute forces. Both interventions and non-interventions are included in the
large and medium-N studies because China, which began playing a more active role in the
UN peace operations regime at the end of the Cold War in 1990, could have potentially
contributed personnel to any of the missions from 1990 until December 2008. Including
cases of non-intervention in the analysis allows for examination of variation on indicators
for the explanatory variable to determine if low measures of strategic value result in a non
or low intervention. Cases are examined at the mission-country level, meaning that each of
the 54 missions is broken into an observation for each mission host state. Thus, there is
one observation for missions deployed to intrastate conflict zones and multiple
observations for those deployed to interstate conflict zones. The explanatory variables are
measured for each individual host state, while the independent variable is measured for the
total UN mission. Although there are justifiable concerns about the disaggregating of data
on the explanatory and independent variables, it allows for a better examination of the
relationship between the strategic value of a host state and China's personnel contribution
level as China may deploy its forces on a mission following an interstate conflict where
one of the host states has a high strategic importance and the other does not. Additionally,
this technique increases the number of total observations.
4.1 Statistical Analysis
The large-N analysis in this thesis includes roughly 70 observations that fall into
the universe of cases described above. Given the relatively small number of observations,
76 2008 List of Operations, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Available online <
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf>.
this analysis does not have the statistical strength to serve as a stand alone study.
However, it is valuable to use this method, which is generally associated with analyzing a
larger number of observations, to identify trends that can then be further studied by the
more nuanced qualitative components of the triangulated research design.
This thesis uses two ordinary least squares regression models to examine the
relationship between the strategic value of a peace operation host state and China's
personnel contribution to the operation. In the first model, referred to as the binary model,
the dependent variable is coded simply as 1 if China contributes forces, regardless of the
number and type of forces. The ordinary least squares method does not produce the best
linear unbiased estimator for binary variables due to the nonlinearity of binary dependent
variables, which makes it difficult to interpret results. 77 The model is included solely as a
reference and basis of comparison with the more appropriate second model. In the second,
or percent participation model, the dependent variable is defined as the percent of a given
mission made up of Chinese forces over the length of the mission:
ChineseContribution -= ChineseMissionContribution
> MissionSize
The mission length is defined as the total number of months the mission was in place
between January 1990 and December 2008, regardless of whether the mission began and
terminated within that period. Mission length is truncated if the mission began prior to
1990 or has yet to terminate. The starting date of the universe of cases coincides with the
first year China deployed peace operations forces, while the end date allows analysis
through the most recent complete year at the time of writing. Measuring the average
77 Hun Myoung Park, Estimating Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using SAS,
STA TA, LIMDEP, and SPSS. Technical Working Paper. The University Information Technology Services
(UITS) Center for Statistical and Mathematical Computing, Indiana University: 1
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percent of a force comprised of Chinese forces is a better measure of China's interest in a
mission than using only the Chinese contribution without taking the mission size into
account; a deployment of 10 Chinese observers to a mission of 20 total UN personnel is
more significant than a deployment of 10 Chinese observes to a mission of 5000 total UN
personnel. Admittedly, there are shortcomings to this percent-based measure that could
potentially jeopardize the significance of findings. First, the truncation of missions
excludes potential future contributions to ongoing missions that could increase the level of
Chinese participation. However, truncating the scope of the research is necessary in order
to establish an endpoint that allows analysis of the most recent complete year, and existing
data should be sufficient for determining trends. Additionally, the percent of a force
comprised of Chinese peacekeepers could be artificially low if China waited until the
latter portion of the scope of the investigation to deploy personnel to a mission that was
launched during the earlier years of the scope of the investigation. For example, China
first deployed personnel to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2006, twenty-
eight years after the mission started. Due to the scope of this study, China would have no
force contributions from 1990 through 2006, driving down its percent contribution. An
alternative method that would eliminate this later concern is to measure the percentage of
the total mission force comprised of Chinese forces in the month of peak Chinese
contribution. While this would likely lead to a slightly higher percent of Chinese
personnel in a given mission force, it is not necessarily representative of Chinese
contributions over time.
Data for the personnel contributions to all UN peace operations is gathered from
two primary sources. Total Chinese contributions for missions between 1990 and 2004 are
listed in the White Paper on China's National Defense in 2004, while the total mission
force is obtained from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Data for
operations launched since 2005 are available from the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations in its monthly "Country-Mission" reports, which list the number of civilian
police, military observers, and troops deployed on a given mission from each contributing
nation. This thesis treats the deployment of Chinese personnel on each mission
collectively, rather than separating civilian police, observe and troop deployments.
Admittedly, the deployment of troops is far different from the deployment of unarmed
military observers and may have different implications for China's ability to project
influence. However, disaggregating the data would result in even fewer observations in an
already small sample size. The sample is partitioned by contribution type in the medium-N
chapter of this thesis. The length of missions is obtained from the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operation's 2008 List of Operations.
The explanatory variable in this analysis is China's strategic value for a peace
operation host state. Existing literature reveals that China's strategic interests are driven
by the concept of comprehensiveness (quan mian hua), a three-dimensional view that
includes the military (security), economic and political spheres. 78 Since China's security
strategy is motivated by these areas, this thesis posits that factors related to the three
realms determine the "strategic value" that China assigns to a potential PKO-host state.
The indicators used to proxy strategic value in this thesis capture measures of key drivers,
as identified by current literature, in each of the three areas of security. The security
component is proxied by an indicator for the protection of China and its periphery from
external intervention, the economic sphere is represented by indicators that measure
78 Ong, 2007: 12
China's ability to develop overseas markets or secure inputs for its expanding economy,
and the political sphere concentrates on indicators that measure conditions that potentially
enable Beijing to expand its political influence globally. 79
In an effort to reduce endogeneity, data for explanatory variable indicators is
lagged by one year prior to the deployment of Chinese personnel for cases where China
intervenes, and by one year prior to the start of the mission for cases where China does not
intervene.
Security Interests
Current discussion of China's desire to protect its territory and periphery from US
encroachment and intervention focuses primarily on its greater involvement with regional
organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization combined with the
development of anti-access capabilities such as diesel-electric submarines and anti-ship
missiles. 80 While these are important components of China's regional security strategy,
China may also be able to expand its regional influence and limit the potential
encroachment of non-Asian actors, such as the United States, by deploying forces to peace
operations that ensure stability in China's periphery. Preventing the spillover of a crisis or
the influx of refugees into China is also a potential security concern.
Geographic Distance
The distance between China and a peace operation host nation is one indicator for
the security component of a state's strategic value. China seeks to develop a security
environment that will be conducive to its peaceful development and protect itself from
79 Philip Saunders, China 's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools. Institute for National Strategic
Studies, Occasional Paper 4 (National Defense University, October 2006): 7-12.80 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009. (Washington, DC:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009): vii.
what it views as a possible US encroachment strategy.81 Accordingly, China has launched
diplomatic efforts in its periphery to maximize its regional influence and has ostensibly
focused much of its military development on preparing for "local wars." 82 If China applies
this strategy to its peace operations participation calculus, China should represent a large
share of total UN personnel deployed to peace operations hosted by countries in its
periphery. By filling a high level of the mission force, China can maximize its influence
while reducing the potential influence of outside actors who might otherwise fill the open
billets in the mission. Thus we expect a strong positive relationship between the
geographic proximity of a peace operations host state to China and the level of China's
peacekeeping participation.
Hdistavg=China will contribute a higher level of Chinese peace personnel to
missions that are geographically closer to China.
Geographic distance is measured using the CEPII Distance Database. CEPII
(Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Intemationales) is a French economic
research center that focuses on the development of databases and analysis of the world
economy. The database includes bilateral distances for 225 countries, which is measured
in two ways: the variable dist is the distance between the most important cities in terms of
2004 population and distcap is the distance between capital cities in a given dyad. This
thesis averages the distance between capitals and the most important cities, using the
variable distavg, to capture elements of influence and security. Despite the availability of
these data, the measures are less than perfect as the averaged distance may actually be
greater than the distance between the closest borders of China and a peace operation host
8' China 's National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, 2006) and Saunders, 2006: 8.
82 China's National Defense in 2006.
nation. For instance, the distance between the Cambodian and Chinese borders is far less
than the distance between Beijing and Phnom Penh. However, attempting to determine the
closest points between two nations using software such as Google Earth proved to be
difficult and highly unreliable with a low degree of inter-coder consistency.
Commercial and Economic Interests
Resources
Much current literature suggests that China is attempting to gain a foothold in
Africa and other developing regions to secure access to critical natural resources such as
oil and gas to fuel its growing population and economy.83 This allows the thesis to test the
theory that China will contribute personnel to peace operations in resource rich states in
order to ensure a stable and secure environment in which Beijing can potentially gain
access to resource wealth. Proven reserves of oil are and gas are used as measures of
resource wealth. Humphreys suggests that third parties may intervene in intrastate wars to
make conflicts short so they can reap the benefits of oil production.8 4 Although
Humphreys' research examines past resource production in addition to proven reserves,
and suggests a causal mechanism based on the provision of partial military assistance to
one of the warring parties during a conflict, the same general theory may apply to peace
operations where states may intervene to ensure sufficient stability for the extraction of
energy resources. Proven reserves are used in this thesis because they represent a source of
resources that a nation can gain access to in the future. China has sought immediate access
to energy resources in existing gas and oil extraction zones, but has also demonstrated its
83 David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs 84 No. 5
(September/October 2005): 25-38
84 Macartan Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the
Mechanisms," Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 No 4. (October 2005):511.
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propensity make large capital investments to extract and secure material resources in
regions without significant past production.85
The regression analysis includes proven gas and oil reserves, which are the
estimated quantities of gas and crude oil that are potentially recoverable. These are
represented by the variables gas_res and oil_res, which are measured in the year prior to
Chinese force deployment or the year prior to the start of the UN mission. Data on energy
resources comes from two sources: the US Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration (EIA) World Energy Reserves Database and the British Petroleum
Statistical Review of World Energy 2008. Both the World Energy Reserves Database and
the Statistical Review track resource production and reserve information by state over
time. When quantities differ between the two sources, an average between the two sources
is used. In cases where data is missing in both datasets, the approximate quantity is
mathematically imputed. All data is converted so that oil is measured in billions of barrels
and gas is measured in trillions of cubic feet.
If China's participation in peace operations is driven by a utility maximizing realist
rationale, there should be a positive relationship between the quantity of energy resources
in a peace operation host state and the level of Chinese peacekeeping there. We therefore
hypothesize:
Hgas_res=Higher levels of proven gas reserves in a peace operation host state will
lead to higher levels of Chinese peace personnel contribution in the peace
operation.
85 For example, in November 2008, China announced final plans for the construction of a $2.5 billion oil and
gas pipeline through Myanmar, connecting the deepwater port of Sittwe to Kunming in China's
southwestern Yunnan province. This pipeline was one project of the $10.5 billion recently invested or
allocated in energy projects in Yunnan.
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Hoi,,,res=Higher levels of proven oil reserves in a peace operation host state will
lead to higher levels of Chinese peace personnel contribution in the peace
operation.
Trade
In addition to securing energy resource inputs for its growing economy, existing
literature discusses China's objective of seeking markets for its consumer goods. This
reasoning leads to the hypothesis that:
Htrade=Higher levels of bilateral trade between China and a peace operation host
state will lead to higher levels of Chinese peace personnel contribution in the peace
operation.
Thus, this thesis analyzes the impact that bilateral trade between China and peace
operations host states has on the level of Chinese force contributions. Trade data is
obtained from the Correlates of War Bilateral Trade Data Set v2.01, which measures
bilateral trade flow from 1870 to 2006. Although this data set does not include data
through the end of the 2008 end date for this thesis' research scope, it is suitable as no UN
peace operations were launched in 2008, nor was a new Chinese deployment made since
2007. Thus, the existing data through 2006 is sufficient for the time-lagged regression
used in this analysis.
Admittedly bilateral trade between China and a peace operation host state may
increase after the deployment of Chinese personnel, however measuring the level of trade
ex ante will capture whether or not Chinese personnel are deployed to protect existing
markets. Future comparative analysis could examine Chinese peace personnel
contributions on trade by comparing bilateral trade levels between China and peace
operations host states in the year prior to the Chinese intervention with trade levels two
years after the initial Chinese deployment. Two years is chosen as the time interval simply
for data availability. The Bilateral Trade Data Set runs through 2006, and China launched
multiple peace operation deployments in 2004. One year is likely too short to see any
significant changes in trade levels, but two years is the maximum period of observation




Much existing literature states that as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, China uses both its veto power and contributions to peace operations as a means
of coercing peace operations host nations to weaken diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 86
During the Kosovo crisis, China vetoed a resolution to extend the UN mission protecting
Macedonia's borders after Macedonia established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. More
recently, China deployed its forces to the UN Mission in Liberia in March 2004, just six
months after China and Liberia reestablished diplomatic ties. The recent deployment of
Chinese forces to Haiti, a country that recognizes the Republic of China, challenges this
wisdom. In the analysis an indicator variable is used to identify whether countries
maintain diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) or with the
Republic of China (ROC). An examination of data on diplomatic relations in the
Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange Data Set, which provides data on diplomatic
relations for the entire set of nations in this study reveals that including this variable in
regression analysis would not yield any significant results. Given the small number of
86 Gill and Reilly, 2000: 46.
nations that recognize the Republic of China, this variable was considered, but omitted
from the regression analysis.
Overseas Chinese Population
Overseas Chinese are ethnic Han individuals who are either Chinese-born or of
Chinese ancestry living outside the Chinese mainland. Overseas Chinese play an
important role in China and there are cabinet level positions reserved for Overseas
Chinese in the Chinese government. Additionally, two of China's largest peacekeeping
deployments were to East Timor and Cambodia, states with large Chinese diasporas. It is
possible that China seeks to protect the lives of its citizens living outside of the Greater
China region and will increase peacekeeping participation in states with high overseas
Chinese populations. Given this reasoning, this thesis hypothesizes:
Hoverseas=China will deploy higher levels of Chinese peace personnel in states with
a larger Overseas Chinese population.
Data on Overseas Chinese populations was gathered from a dataset maintained by the
Shao Overseas Chinese Research Center at Ohio University. While the dataset lacks
entries for the Overseas Chinese population in some host states in the year prior to the
start of the mission, we examine media reports from the International Herald Tribune and
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service to look for indications of anti-immigrant acts
or large scale immigration from China, which could result in significant changes in the
Overseas Chinese population. This project measures Overseas Chinese population using
ordinal measures for small, medium, or large based on the Overseas Chinese population in
a host state relative to Overseas Population in other countries. The regression model
controls for whether the mission host state is in Asia, as contribution levels could be
driven by the state's presence in China's Asian periphery, where states tend to have larger
Chinese populations
4.2 Medium-N Analysis
Medium-N analysis is a unique form of qualitative analysis that retains properties
of both case studies and statistical analysis, while focusing specifically on the causal
linkages between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. The medium-N
analysis conducted in this thesis is a modification on a method developed by Michael Ross
(2004). In his work on the influence of natural resources in civil war, Ross tests a number
of hypothesis using anecdotal and historical observations from multiple cases of civil
wars. The medium-N approach in this thesis includes the same 54 cases and explanatory
variables as the large-N regression analysis. For each observation, the hypotheses tested in
the regression analysis are again tested using a qualitative medium-N test. Medium-N
analysis alone has a number of important limitations, such as sacrificing the level of detail
traditionally found in comprehensive case studies, leaves little room for counterfactuals,
and does not identify correlations across a large number of observations as regressions are
able to. Still, the medium-N analysis provides a vital link between the general trends
captured by the large-N analysis and the case studies. It serves to clarify causal linkages
by concentrating on the case-specific factors that are generally lost in regression analysis.
4.3 Case Studies
In this thesis, case studies serve three important purposes. First, they are used to
examine variation between the level of peace operation participation in states where China
intervenes. The large and medium-N analyses only capture general trends and do not
allow for differentiation between states where China commits a large number of forces
from a state where total Chinese participation is low. Second, case studies illustrate that
the theory proposed in this thesis is falsifiable and allows us to discuss alternative
explanations. Lastly, case studies allow for a closer analysis of China's contributions to
Africa, where much of China's peacekeeping efforts have focused.
A comparative case study using a method of difference between China's peace
operation participation in the Sudan and Chad serves the first purpose. The two countries
are similar geographically and demographically and are both host states to UN peace
operations launched between 2005 and 2007, respectively. Despite these similarities,
China deployed forces to Sudan but not to Chad. An in-depth analysis will attempt to
identify any variation in the explanatory variable indicators that led to the different levels
of participation. A case study of Haiti examines a situation that does not appear to follow
the model. According to the coding used in this thesis, Haiti has a low strategic value to
China, yet China has deployed a sizeable and well armed force to the UN mission there.
Case study analysis will allow for the discussion of alternative explanations for China's
participation. Potential challenges including the external validity of findings gathered from
region specific case studies is a valid concern, however triangulation with the statistical
and medium-N methods allows for a more robust test.
Chapter Five
Statistical Analysis: Findings and Discussion
TABLE 2. Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Distance 76 .639 .218 .238 1
Chinese Exports 68 .045 .136 0 1
Chinese Imports 68 .044 .161 0 1
Oil Reserves 40 .111 .294 .00002 1
Gas Reserves 32 .055 .179 .0000182 1
Overseas Chinese 49 .059 .212 .0000174 1
Linear regression analysis of strategic value indicators, described in chapter four,
and Chinese participation in United Nations peace operations reveal few substantive and
significant relationships. This lack of statistical significance stems largely from the small
sample size of seventy-six country-missions. The number of mission-countries is further
truncated by missing data on both the dependent and independent variables. In some
regression models, there are just twenty-eight mission-countries, far smaller than the
sample sizes generally associated with large-N statistical analysis. For this reason,
multivariate regressions including controls for factors such as time are generally not run,
as the small sample size would render statistical analysis virtually meaningless. Although
the lack of statistically significant findings limits the conclusions that can be drawn from
the data, coefficients are generally in the expected directions, suggesting a positive
relationship between factors such as trade flows and oil reserves with China's peace
operations participation and consistent with the hypotheses above. Coefficients in both the
binary model and the percentage participation model, are in the same direction for all six
indicators except for one, the overseas Chinese population in a peace operation host state.
TABLE 3. Chinese Peace Operations Participation and Strategic Value (Binary Model)
Models 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11








Gas Reserves -. 325
(.498)






Constant .491 .239 .532 .314 .324 .276 .393 .455 .402
(.174) (.287) (.172) (.060) (.059) (.079) (.092) (.075) (.093)
N 76 76 76 68 68 40 32 49 49
TABLE 4. Chinese Contribution Level and Strategic Value (Percent Participation Model)
Models 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11








Gas Reserves -. 067
(.224)
Overseas Chinese .053 .057
(.190) (.205)




Constant .129 .082 .141 .061 .057 .064 .094 .140 .142
(.085) (.142) (.084) (.027) (.024) (.035) (.044) (.044) (.053)
N 69 69 69 62 62 36 28 44 44
Commercial and Economic Interests
Chinese Imports and Exports
Trade related indicators are the most substantive and significant drivers of China's
participation and level of contribution in peace operations. In the binary model, Chinese
exports to peace operation host states are the most substantive indicator with a coefficient
of .84. Exports from China to a peace operation host state, are the second most substantive
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driver in the percent participation model, where the coefficient is .60. In both the binary
and participation percent models, coefficients on the export indicator are statistically
significant with p=.052 and p=.002, respectively. Chinese imports from mission countries
also appear to be substantive and significant in both the binary and percent participation
model with coefficients of .661 (p=.070) and .697 (p=.000). Both the import and export
related relationships are strongly driven by Chinese force contributions to the two UN
missions in Sudan. China has deployed some of its largest contingents to Sudan, a nation
with which it maintained the largest bilateral trade flows of any mission-country since
1990. When the two missions in Sudan are dropped from the dataset, the coefficient on
normalized Chinese exports in the percent participation model drops to .22 and loses
statistical significance (p=.575). The coefficient on the binary model surprisingly
increases to .965, but loses statistical significance (p=.353). Coefficients for imports also
decrease significantly when the two Sudanese cases are dropped. In the percent
participation model, the coefficient drops to .167 (p=.789) while in the binary model, the
coefficient is no longer consistent with the hypothesis and becomes negative with a value
of -.480 (p=.763).
Oil and Gas Reserves
The mercantilist argument for Chinese peace operations participation discussed in
many media and policy circles often examines the role of China's peacekeeping in the
context of gaining access to natural resources. While China has deployed sizeable peace
operations contingents to missions in countries with large resource reserves like Sudan,
Chinese personnel have also been deployed in large numbers to countries with limited or
nonexistent oil and gas reserves including Lebanon and Liberia. This suggests that China
treats each potential mission on a case-by-case basis, assessing a spectrum of factors in
addition to oil and gas reserves. The limited sample size for analysis of gas and oil
reserves in both the binary and percent participation model, in which n was always less
than 40 causes findings to be largely insignificant. The dearth of data on oil and gas
reserves, which contributes to the small sample size, may stem in part from the lack of
accurate resource reporting mechanisms in failed states and states in the midst of conflict,
where peace operations are most likely to occur.
Given these limitations, coefficients are neither substantive nor significant, but do
illustrate the lack of any clear trend that would fully support the mercantilist view of
Chinese peace operations. In both models there is a weakly positive but insignificant
relationship between the size of a state's oil reserves and Chinese peacekeeping efforts
there. The coefficient of .213 (p=.406) in the binary model is substantially higher than the
percent participation model coefficient of .079 (p=.471) because the binary model codes
any deployment, regardless of size, as "1." Thus, extremely small deployments of Chinese
observers to missions in oil rich areas, such as the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
(UNIKOM), are treated identically to deployments of nearly 1000 personnel to missions in
other oil rich states.
Surprisingly the coefficient on gas reserves in both models is weakly negative,
which contradicts the hypothesis that there would be higher levels of peace operation
participation in states with greater proven gas reserves. The sample size in both cases is
less than 32, far less than required for traditional large-N analysis. The small sample size
allows trends to be shaped largely by a few outliers. For instance, in the universe of all
peace operation host states since 1990, Iran has by far the largest proven reserves of gas,
yet China deployed no personnel there. Additionally, even if China had chosen to deploy
personnel, the total number and type of personnel they could have contributed would have
been limited, as the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was authorized to
be composed primarily of military observers.8 7 Thus, the percent participation of Chinese




At initial inspection, the relationship between distance and both participation and
the level of China's contributions appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that larger
contributions and participation decrease as geographic distance between China and a
peace operation host state increases. There is a weak negative relationship with distance in
both the binary and percent participation models, with coefficients of -.192 (p=.460) and -
.048 (p=.7 01), respectively. However, this relationship is neither substantive nor
significant. Relatively large deployments of Chinese peace operations personnel to UN
missions in Africa and the Middle East, regions that are geographically distant from
China, appear to contradict the coefficient of the regression analysis. While China has
deployed some of its largest peace operations contingents to missions in East Timor and
Cambodia, large deployments to non-Asian states suggests that China examines a broad
variety of factors in each potential mission before contributing personnel.
Overseas Chinese Population
87 "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)-Background," United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2003. Available online:
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/comission/uniimogbackgr.html>.
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The population of overseas Chinese in peace operation host states is the only
variable where coefficients in the two models are in opposite directions. In the binary
model, the variable has a coefficient of -.096 (p=.783), while in the percent participation
model it is .053 (p=.784). In both models the population of overseas Chinese is the least
substantive and significant variable. The thesis initially hypothesized that higher overseas
Chinese populations could lead states to have a higher strategic value. Analysis of data,
however, reveals no relationship between overseas populations and Chinese participation
or their level of contributions to peace operations. While China has deployed sizeable
peace operations contingents to states with large Chinese populations like East Timor and
Cambodia, there are even larger Chinese contingents in Sudan, Liberia, and Lebanon,
which have relatively small Chinese populations. The presence of overseas Chinese
residents in an unstable state would likely be insufficient in itself to warrant Chinese
personnel contributions to a peace operation because of the costs, logistical complexities,
and other challenges associated with deploying personnel. The Chinese government would
more likely evacuate Chinese citizens from a potentially dangerous area in order to rapidly
and directly protect overseas Chinese. Indeed, China, like many other nations, has
previously evacuated its citizens from dangerously unstable nations including Lebanon
and East Timor.88 China considered these evacuations as a means of "putting people first"
and "exercising the state power for the benefit of the people," demonstrating China's
commitment to protecting overseas Chinese, albeit without the deployment of Chinese
88 See "China to evacuate citizens from East Timor," Embassy of the People's Republic of China in
Australia. 29 May 2006. Available online: <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t255320.htm>. Also,
"Official of the Department of Consular Affairs Takes an Interview on the Evacuation of Chinese Citizens
from Lebanon," Press Release. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 26 July 2006.
Available online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/yfgk/t265432.htm>.
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peace operations forces. 89 These evacuations might not include all those who fall under
the umbrella designation of overseas Chinese, but would undoubtedly evacuate all
Chinese nationals and residents of the Special Administrative Regions of Macao and Hong
Kong. Evacuating Taiwanese nationals would also not be out of the question as China has
offered protection to citizens of Taiwan in recent years, including the protection of
Taiwan-owned ships in the Gulf of Aden.
Conclusion
The data reveal few significant and substantive relationships between the
indicators of strategic value and Chinese peacekeeping contributions. While this may
initially appear to demonstrate that China is less of a realist actor in its peacekeeping
decisions than hypothesized, the small sample size makes it difficult to draw significant
conclusions from the statistical analysis. Despite not being statistically significant or
substantive, the weak presence of trends that are in the generally in the same direction as
hypothesized warrants further analysis using alternate methods that will more effectively
examine casual mechanisms and relationships.
89 "Official of the Department of Consular Affairs Takes an Interview on the Evacuation of Chinese Citizens
from Lebanon."
Chapter Six
Medium-N Analysis and Findings
The statistical analysis reveals positive trends in the relationship between a state's
oil reserves, trade, and overseas Chinese population and China's personnel contributions
to UN peace operations there. However, given the small sample size that comprises the
universe of cases, regressions alone do little to identify and examine the causal
mechanisms that explain variation in the level of Chinese troop contributions to peace
operations in different countries. Relying on case studies alone would also be insufficient;
even though they can be highly internally valid, they do not necessarily reveal
generalizable causal mechanisms because single case analysis fails to capture trends.
Thus, to identify these mechanisms, as well as to address problems of endogeneity, this
thesis relies on a "medium-N" approach. The findings of the medium-N analysis support
the argument proposed in this thesis that China's peace operation participation is driven by
a desire to further China's commercial and diplomatic interests. However, the analysis
also reveals an apparent shift in the drivers behind China's participation that occurs in
2000. Prior to this point, China's deployments tend to be smaller in size and less driven by
elements, like oil reserves and trade flows, which make up a state's strategic value. After
2000, Chinese personnel contributions increase, as does the number of strategic drivers in
each case. This provides empirical support for the theory of China's peaceful development
in the 2000s.
This chapter begins by explaining the medium-N methodology and the selection of
cases. It then offers three general hypotheses that may explain the causal relationship
between a state's strategic value and the level of China's personnel contribution there, and
offers observable implications of each causal relationship. The section then offers
aggregate results from the medium-N analysis.
The medium-N method aggregates qualitative data on causal mechanisms from a
sample of case studies in order to draw inferences and identify trends. In doing this, the
method retains important properties of case studies such as "close attention to the validity
of concepts and to causal linkages; a capacity to account for variables that are difficult to
measure; and a sensitivity to case-specific factors." 90 At the same time medium-N analysis
maintains a concern for generality and an explicit, replicable method, which are both
characteristic of large-N statistical analysis. Michael Ross (2004) defines five steps in his
medium-N approach to hypothesis-testing. 91 First, a researcher must determine general
and falsifiable hypotheses about causal relationships. Next, they must determine
observable implications of each hypothesis. These implications are observations that
should be expected in the case studies if the hypothesis is true. After this, the researcher
must select cases. Fourth, each case is studied to determine the presence or absence of the
observable implications. Finally, the results are aggregated and the researcher uses the
sample to draw inferences about the larger population of cases. The medium-N method
used in this thesis differs slightly from Ross's original design as it not only looks at
individual causal mechanisms across cases, but also examines the interaction of various
causal mechanisms within each case. This potentially allows us to see whether multiple
causal mechanisms are at play in a single case, and how this interaction impacts China's
level of personnel contribution. Admittedly, many of the observable implications are
related, but there is sufficient distinction to conduct this analysis.
90 Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,"
International Organization, 58 (Winter 2004): 37.
91 Ibid: 36-37.
While the medium-N method is an effective tool for examining causal
mechanisms, there are numerous shortcomings to the approach. By aggregating multiple
case studies, the medium-N approach loses a degree of detail and the capacity to fully
disentangle the relevant mechanisms at play. That is in turn rectified through an
examination of individual case studies. This thesis attempts to provide additional detail
using comprehensive single case and comparative case studies in the following chapter.
Additionally, since the approach is qualitative in nature, it cannot identify partial
correlations across a large number of observations. Also, without extensive primary
research on each peace operation, there may not be identifiable and observable phenomena
that explain each causal relationship. Despite these limitations, the medium-N approach
provides a degree of insight into causal mechanisms that is not achievable using either
case studies or large-N analysis alone.
The twenty-eight cases selected for the medium-N analysis are all UNDPKO
mission-countries where China has contributed personnel. This smaller sample, which
constitutes twenty-two distinct missions is used instead of the universe of all UNDPKO
cases since 1990 because by examining only the cases where China has participated, the
thesis is able to identify and analyze observable implications that result in varying levels
of personnel contribution between cases. When applied to this thesis, there are specific
shortcomings to the medium-N method in addition to those previously described. Most
important among these is that the analysis suffers from incomplete information. To locate
observable implications, this thesis relies on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
website, the home pages of various Chinese embassies, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development foreign direct investment database, and two online archives of
translated international newspaper and press service content: LexisNexis Academic and
World News Connection. We limit observations from LexisNexis Academic and World
News Connection to Chinese government and media sources in order to ensure the
observable implications capture the stated position of the Chinese government;
publications by Xinhua and China Daily are assumed to reflect the views of the Chinese
government.
Even with a rigorous search of sources, it is highly probable that some observable
implications were overlooked or miscoded. Cases where observable implications are
explicitly discussed in the sources listed above are coded in the medium-N analysis chart
(Table 5, below) as a positive implication. Observations are coded as missing only if no
information on the observable implication is available and if it cannot be inferred from
other data. For instance the search of sources revealed no reports of existing Chinese
resource extraction agreements in Iraq in 1990 and in Kosovo in 2004. The analysis
coded Iraq as a missing observation because Iraq has large oil reserves that China could
have potentially drawn from, however the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not
have an online country profile for Iraq. Even if an extraction agreement with Iraq existed,
it did not appear in the sources used in this analysis. The case is therefore coded as
missing. Kosovo, on the other hand, was coded as not having any resource extraction
agreements with China. This coding was inferred from the lack of any significant
extractable resources in the region based on highly regarded data from British Petroleum,
making an extraction agreement highly unlikely.
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Hypotheses and Observable Implications
A nation's strategic value may influence the level of Chinese contribution to a
peace operation in numerous ways. The hypotheses described below are extrapolated from
the Chinese literature and academic research described earlier in the theory section. For
the medium-N tests, this thesis associates explicit causal mechanisms and motivators with
the established hypotheses. Some of the indicators used in the statistical analysis have
been aggregated into categories that encompass the driving forces of China's peace
operations policy and allow the thesis to explicitly state casual mechanisms. For instance,
instead of examining oil and gas reserves directly, the medium-N analysis looks at the
presence of Chinese resource extraction agreements in a state, as it potentially provides a
driver for Chinese peace operations in the country. The causal mechanisms are therefore
divided into three categories: commercial and economic interests, resource wealth, and
diplomatic interests. Some of the hypotheses are similar and others may interact.
However, each set of hypotheses is examined individually to more clearly test causal
mechanisms.
Commercial and Economic Interests
Hypothesis:
Strong trade and investment relationships between China and the peace operation
host state should lead to increased Chinese personnel contributions because China seeks to
protect Chinese infrastructure, ensure continued production of exportable items in peace
operation host nations and maintain secure port and transportation infrastructure, while at
the same time building China's soft power in the peace operation host nation.
If this mechanism is true, we should observe Chinese discussion of the need for
stability to ensure economic development and to protect Chinese owned investment. This
might be reflected as criticism that the conflict is hampering trade and production of
goods. While closely related to resource wealth extraction, trade and investment is
included as a distinct category in this medium-N analysis as it includes trade and Chinese
outward foreign direct investment in areas other than natural resources.
Evidence:
Discussion ofEconomic Development
The survey of government press releases and Chinese media reports searched for
the terms "economic," "stability," and "development," along with "China" and the name
of the peace operation host state in the two years prior to China's first personnel
contribution to the mission. The articles and releases were then read to ensure that they
discussed a Chinese desire for economic development and stability in the peace operation
host state. This eliminated unrelated articles found by the search because of the presence
of the search terms. Cases where discussion of economic development was present were
coded as a "Yes" in the medium-N analysis chart. When no media or government
discussion was found, the case was coded as a "No" in the analysis chart, implying that
there were no observable implications.
Concerns surrounding economic development likely contributed to the Chinese
decision to deploy peacekeepers in eight distinct missions of the twenty-eight mission
countries (twenty-two distinct missions), or thirty-seven percent of the missions where
China deployed. There was virtually no government or press discussion that explicitly
promoted the protection of Chinese interests in peace operation host states, but Chinese
media and government sources discussed the need for stability and general economic
growth in eight of the twenty-two missions.92 Eight of these observations were in peace
operations where China first deployed personnel after 2000. Discussion related to
economic factors is generally not found in cases prior to 2000, which was also an era
when China primarily deployed military observers. These observations were generally not
found in articles or announcements focused on the deployment of a Chinese peacekeeping
contingent, but rather were discussed in articles that described conditions within the peace
operations host nation. The only observed case where China specifically discussed the
need to protect Chinese interests was during the civil war in Burundi. In this case, the
foreign ministry announcement dealt not with the protection of commercial interests, but
rather of the Chinese Embassy in Bujumbura, which had been accidentally shelled in
November 2003 during fighting between the army and rebels. 93
Discussion of the need for stability in order to promote economic growth and
development was first observed in government and press sources prior to China's
deployment to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999. Discussion
of the importance of economic development in peace operation host states increases after
2000, with observations of such commentary in all but five of thirteen post-2000 missions
where China has participated. Economic development is not mentioned in Chinese
discussion, of UN missions in Burndi, Lebanon, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Haiti, and the
first UN mission in East Timor. The increased attention to economic development in
peace operation host states roughly corresponds with the announcement of China's "Going
Out" policy in 2002 and China's increased international economic presence.
92 The eight missions are: UNMIK, UAMSIL, MONUC, UNMEE, UNMISET, UNMIS, UNMIT, and
UNAMID.
93 "China urges Burundi to ensure safety of diplomats after accidental shelling," Xinhua. 11 November 2003.
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Chinese leadership affirmed the importance of economic stability in Sierra Leone
one year later, shortly before the more robust UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
replaced UNOMSIL. In a meeting with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone,
President Jiang Zemin stated, "there is great potential for economic and trade cooperation
between the nations," and offered to encourage Chinese firms to enter into "mutually
beneficial initiatives" with Sierra Leone as the country worked its way toward political
stability.94 During the same meeting, China and Sierra Leone signed an agreement on
economic and technical cooperation. China had previously provided significant assistance
with construction and development projects that could improve the economy of Sierra
Leone. These projects include building power generation and transmission infrastructure,
roads, and facilities for teaching rice and sugar cultivation techniques. 95
China stated its commitment to stabilizing and improving the East Timorese
economy prior to its participation in the UN Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET) in May 2002 and again in the years prior to China's participation in the UN
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) in October 2006. Chinese Foreign Minister
Tang Jiaxuan met with East Timor's senior minister for foreign affairs in May 2002, two
days prior to the date of East Timor's official independence. During this conference, Tang
stressed that China would develop "good neighborly relations" with East Timor and would
implement arrangements for economic and technical cooperation. 96 That same month,
China contributed 69 police personnel to UNMISET, a mission intended to ensure the
security of the newly independent state. The mission mandate tasked the force with
94 "Ties With Sierra Leone Important," China Daily. 2 June 1999. Lexis Nexis.
95 "Bilateral Relations: Sierra Leone," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 12.
October 2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/3084/>.
96 "Chinese foreign minister holds talks with East Timorese counterpart," Xinhua. 19 May 2002.
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providing interim law enforcement and public security, developing an East Timor Police
Service, and contributing to the external and internal security of East Timor.97 Over the
course of the mission China provided an additional 138 police officers. Two years later,
Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan praised the "momentum of developing bilateral
ties" with East Timor and the "fruitful achievements in promoting...social stability and
economic growth." 98 China's continued interest in the wellbeing of East Timor's economy
may have led to China's participation in UNMIT, where China has contributed about 40
police officers and observers. Despite a rigorous search, no sources purely discussing
economic development prior to China's contribution of observers to the UN Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) could be found. Media reporting focuses
primarily on stating China's commitment to aiding in East Timor's stable transition.99 It is
possible that China avoided publicly discussing economic development with East Timor
prior to its official date of independence for fear of appearing to support a sub-national
political entity.
China also expressed the importance of economic stability prior to making
personnel contributions to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The UN
Security Council established UNMEE in 2000 to monitor the ceasefire between Ethiopia
and Eritrea. The mandate recommended that the mission consist of over 200 military
observers and three infantry battalions at a given time.100 Over the course of the mission,
which ended in August 2008, China provided a total of 49 military observers.
97 "East Timor -UNMISET - Background," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006.
Available online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/background.html>.
98 "Chinese state councilor meets minister of East Timor," Xinhua. 26 April 2004.
99 "China: East Timorese Choice Respected," China Daily. 21 January 2000.
0oo "Ethiopia and Eritrea -UNMEE - Background," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
2008. Available online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/background.html>.
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Interestingly, China expressed an interest in the economic stability of Ethiopia, but not
Eritrea, suggesting that China may contribute personnel even if only one of the host states
in a multi-state peace operation has strategic value. During a meeting with the Vice-
Premier of Ethiopia that was held the day the Ethiopia-Eritrea war began, the Chinese
Foreign Trade minister spoke about the prospects for Sino-Ethiopean economic
coordination. 1 1 China's support for Ethiopian economic development continued
throughout the war. In December 1999, Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation, Xu Bingjin traveled to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to deliver a grant
and interest-free loan, part of which was to be used to purchase machinery, spare parts,
and equipment for a textile factory. 102
China's first deployment of troops on a UN peace operation outside of Asia was to
the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Since
April 2001, China has deployed over 2000 troops and military observers to the region,
most of which serve in medical or engineering companies. 103 In a speech to the Security
Council a year prior to China's MONUC deployment, China's permanent representative to
the United Nation, Qin Huasun, urged greater UN action in resolving the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo during a speech to the Security Council a year prior to
the first Chinese deployment to MONUC. 10 4 Qin argued that stability and economic
development we intertwined, stating that, "the fundamental way...for the DRC to be able
to enjoy lasting peace and stability is for the international community to...develop the
1ol "'Great' Prospects for Sino-Ethiopian Ties," China Daily. 12 May 1998.
102 "Grant, loan agreement signed with China," radio report on Radio Ethiopia. Aired 4 December 1999.
103 United Nations Map No. 4121, Rev 23. MONUC. United Nations Department of Field Support,
Cartographic Section. April 2009.
104 "China's UN envoy calls for UN action to end DR Congo war," Xinhua. 26 January 2000.
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economy. 105 While this statement suggests that economic development will lead to
stability, it also implies that relation between stability and economic development. In the
year prior to China's first MONUC deployment, bilateral trade between Congo and China
amounted to $332.67 million dollars. Of this amount, roughly $9 million were Chinese
exports to Congo, consisting primarily of Chinese machinery and light industry products.
Key exports from Congo to China included mineral ores of cobalt, zinc, and copper.' 06
In late 2003, China announced its hopes for a quick resolution of the "Kosovo
issue." China hoped the United Nations would be able to improve the economy, combat
organized crime, and establish government organizations, with the ultimate goal of
making "comprehensive progress in its government, economy, society, and other areas" in
order to promote reconciliation in the region.107 While these statements encourage
economic development and stability, this example must be treated differently from the
other cases, as Kosovo was not an independent state when these comments were made.
China would not likely attempt to develop sub-national economic ties without the
permission of the Serbian government. Thus, it is unclear whether economic motives
drove China's participation in the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).
Nevertheless, China has deployed over 70 civilian police officers to the mission since
April 2004.
Of the countries where China has deployed peace operations forces, it is likely
most economically connected to Sudan. While most Sino-Sudanese economic and trade
relations surround China's growing presence in the Sudanese oil sector, China also
105 Ibid.
106 "Bilateral Relations: Congo," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 12 October
2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2959/>.
107 "PRC Deputy Representative to UN Hopes for Early Resolution of Kosovo Issue," originally in Chinese,
Beijing Zhongguou Xinwen She, translated by FBIS. 31 October 2003.
70
maintains considerable export flows to Sudan. In 2004, the year prior to China's first
deployment to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Chinese exports to Sudan amounted to
$531 million of roughly $2.2 billion in bilateral trade. By 2006, the year prior to China's
participation in the African Union-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Chinese
exports to Sudan made up just under half of the $3.5 billion in trade. 10 8 Given Sudan's
position as China's largest trading partner of the mission countries where China has
deployed forces, it is no surprise that Chinese leadership has openly voiced their interest in
the stability and development of the Sudanese economy. Prior to the first deployment of
Chinese forces to UNMIS, Chinese press described the "mutually-beneficial cooperation
between the two countries" and how it has led to "fruitful results" in the economic and
trade sectors. 109 President Hu Jintao also announced that China was deploying
peacekeepers to Sudan in order to provide a guarantee for the peace process between the
Government of Sudan and southern rebel groups in order to bring stability and
development to the Sudanese people. 110 Sudanese government officials also praised
Chinese support for Sudan's economic development. Prior to Chinese president Hu
Jintao's 2007 visit to Sudan, the Sudanese Minster of Information and Communications
stated that "China was not only supporting Sudan in the economic field for the sake of
take-off of the Sudanese economy...hut was also a good and strong supporter of Sudan in
the political domain."111
No discussion concerning the importance of economic development and stability
was found in the cases of Lebanon, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, and Haiti. These three
108 Katherine Barbieri, Omar Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2008. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set
Codebook, Version 2.0. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org
109 "Chinese, Sudanese leaders agree on further expanding ties," Xinhua. 23 April 2005.
"o Ibid.
11 "Sudan minister hails Chinese leader's visit," Xinhua. 31 January 2007.
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countries all maintain non-negligible trade flows with China. In the year prior to the first
Chinese deployment in each respective state, China maintained bilateral trade flows of
$573.4 million with Lebanon, $96.4 million with Liberia, and $161.3 million with the
Ivory Coast. China's contributions to some of the missions, particularly the UN Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), far exceeds missions where Chinese media and government
sources discuss the importance of economic stability and development. Thus, lack of
economic oriented discussion does not imply a lack of economic importance in these
cases, but rather suggests the possibility that articles and announcements focused on these
mission countries were not included in the media content archives used in this thesis.
The lack of economic concern surrounding Haiti is not surprising. Chinese trade
with Haiti was minimal in the year prior to the first Chinese deployment amounting to just
over $20 million. Lack of trade between the two nations is likely the result of poor
economic conditions following decades of instability on the island nation. Haiti is the
least-developed country in the Western Hemisphere with more than eighty-percent of the
population living below the poverty line, making the nation a poor market for Chinese
manufactured goods. Additionally, primarily exports are limited to a small amount of
agricultural commodities such as coffee and sugarcane. 112 The absence of significant trade
ties justifies the lack of economic development themed discussion, and suggests that
China deployed personnel to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for
other than trade related reasons. China's participation in MINUSTAH is described in
greater detail using a case study in Chapter Seven of this thesis.
112 "Haiti," The 2008 CIA World Factbook.
Joint Ventures and Chinese Foreign Direct Investment
The discussion above reveals the importance that China attaches to economic
stability and development in peace operation host states, potentially revealing an
economic motive behind China's personnel contributions. The thesis examines whether
China is more willing to contribute its forces to missions in states where enhanced
stability offers the possibility of protecting infrastructure owned or manned by Chinese
nationals. While open discussion of economic matters was observed in only eight of the
twenty-eight mission countries, China maintained joint ventures and foreign direct
investment (FDI) stocks in at least eleven distinct missions where China has participated.
Data on the presence of joint ventures and Chinese FDI in five cases was not located,
leaving seventeen remaining cases. Of these seventeen, eleven missions or sixty-five
percent were launched in countries where China had FDI or joint ventures. The medium-
N analysis of FDI and joint ventures relies on data from the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), country overviews from China's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and foreign direct investment data issued by China's Ministry of Commerce.
The changing status of Liberia's diplomatic relations with China, which shifted
numerous times between recognition of Taipei and Beijing, limited the extent of
continuous joint ventures and large scale foreign direct investment. Chinese companies
were present in the Liberian labor market prior to China's contribution of 33 military
observers to the UN Observer Mission in Liberia between November 1993 and September
1997. However, due to the lack of Sino-Liberian ties prior to 1993, this activity was
dwarfed by investment from Taiwan. In 1993, Chinese FDI inflows stood at $3.6 million,
amounting to just one third of FDI inflows from Taiwan during this era.11 3 Information
concerning joint ventures and Chinese FDI between 1993 and 2003, when China deployed
a large troop contingent to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), is limited. In 2001,
Chinese firms were absent from the list of Liberia's top twenty-five foreign business
affiliates. Japanese-owned sea freight transport companies that maintained significant
investments or sales in Liberia dominated this list. 114 In 2003, Chinese foreign directed
investment inflows amounted to $5.8 million." 5
Minimal levels of Chinese commercial cooperation with Sierra Leone began in
1984, fourteen years before China deployed observers to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone
and the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. The first reported case of economic
cooperation between the states took place in 1984 when the Chinese state-owned Fujian-
Africa Fishing Company signed a fishing cooperation contract with the Okeky Agent
Company of Sierra Leone. 116 The first joint venture and Chinese FDI-stocks in appeared
in 1985, however the first large scale Chinese investments in Sierra Leone appear in the
2000s. 117 The minimal level of investment prior to the deployment of Chinese personnel
makes it unlikely that the desire to protect Chinese owned and invested infrastructure was
a key driving force in the decision to contribute forces there. Interestingly, Chinese
investment in the country seems to increase after the start of Chinese personnel
contributions, which spanned from 1998 until 2005. For example, a Chinese development
firm signed an agreement with the National Tourist Board of Sierra Leone in 2004 for the
113 "FDI in Least Developed Countries at a Glance: 2002 Liberia" UNCTAD. 2003. Available online:
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia6lr en.pdf>.
114 Ibid.
115 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment. (Beijing: Ministry of Commerce
of the People's Republic of China, 2007)
116 "Bilateral Relations: Sierra Leone," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 12
October 2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/3084/>.
117 Ibid.
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construction of a $266 million beach resort complex. Given the small number of observers
deployed, it is quite unlikely that the investments were a direct result of the presence of
Chinese forces alone, but perhaps China was benefitting from the additional stability
provided by the peace operations force. Admittedly, it is virtually impossible to
distinguish development and investment that is the result of improved stability in Sierra
Leone from generally increasing participation of Chinese firms countries throughout
Africa during this time period.
China launched its first joint ventures and fully owned companies in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in the early 1980s. The first joint firms concentrated on
agricultural development, while later firms such as the Huamao Forest and Timber
Company and the New Oasis Coffee Company were entirely Chinese owned."118 China
continued to make investments in the country throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s
despite the relative instability of the country. In 2000, a Chinese based
telecommunications company received an 80 million RMB preferential loan issued by the
China Import and Export Bank to set up the China Telecommunications Company in
Congo. The firm, which is majority owned by China's ZTE Telecom, is a joint venture
with Congo's Ministry of Communications and provides mobile and landline
communication in Congo.119 China's first deployment to the UN Mission in Congo
(MONUC) was the contribution of 10 military observers and troops in the spring of 2001.
It was not until 2003 that China greatly increased its contributions by deploying larger
Chinese engineering and medical units. The first large deployment coincides
118 "Bilateral Relations: Congo (Kinshasa)," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.
12 October 2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2959/>.
119 "Government Loan Supporting Congo-China Joint Telecom Venture," ZTE Press Release. 14 December
2000. Available online: <http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/main/NewsEvents/WhatsNew/2001121452320.shtml>.
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approximately with the announcement of China's going out policy and the growth of
Chinese investment in the Congo. In 2003, Chinese FDI inflows amounted to just
$240,000. The following year, investment had jumped to $15.69 million. By the end of
2007, Chinese inflows were valued in excess of $100 million. 120 Much of this increase
was due to investment in mining Congo's rich mineral wealth, which may have come
about due to the increased stability provided by MONUC, a mission with the mandate of
implementing the ceasefire following the Congolese Civil War.12 1
China first deployed personnel to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea in fall
2000 and contributed a total of 49 military observers before the mission ended in 2008.122
Economic and technological exchange between Ethiopia and China began in 1971, with
Chinese firms first entering Ethiopia in 1986.123 Throughout the 1990s, Chinese
companies were involved in a variety of industries and projects in Ethiopia, including
bridge engineering, hydropower, and construction. The total value of these cooperative
endeavors was over $710 million by the end of 2002.124 More significant investment in
Ethiopia was launched during the early 2000s. For instance, in 2004, Sinopec's
Zhongyuan Petroleum Prospecting established an Ethiopian subsidiary that launched
operations in Ethiopia. The Chinese-owned firm, which included Chinese nationals
working in Addis Ababa, conducted seismic surveys in the Gambella Block. 125
120 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
121 "Resolution 1291" S/RES/1291 (2000). United Nations Security Council. 20 February 2000.
122 China 's National Defense in 2008. (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, 2009).
123 "Bilateral Relations: Ethiopia," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 12
October 2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2984/>.
124 Ibid.
125 Information on ZPEB is available at http://www.zpebint.com/en/foreigncompany/Ethiopia.jsp.
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In 2004, China made its first contribution of forces to the UN Operation in Cote
d'Ivoire. By December 2008, China had deployed 33 military observers to the mission.126
A year prior to the arrival of Chinese observers, Chinese FDI inflow to Cote d'Ivoire was
$8.05 million, an amount that increased to $29.11 million by the end of 2005.127 Much of
this growth in investment is likely the result of China's growing role in oil exploration,
including partial Chinese ownership of an oil field, which is discussed in greater detail
below. While there was significant growth in FDI Significant Chinese joint ventures were
established in Cote d'Ivoire as early as 1997. These included the Hua-Ke Vehicles
Company, the Agro-machinery Assembling Company. 128 A third joint venture, the Qingke
Chocolate Food Company, was based in China but relied on large cocoa exports from
Cote d'Ivoire. 129
China's participation in the UN Operation in Burundi spanned from June 2004 to
September 2006, during which China contributed a total of just six military observers. The
size of this deployment makes it extremely unlikely that China was attempting to protect
any infrastructure or investments. Chinese investment in Burundi appears to focus largely
on infrastructural development rather than significant commercial development.' 30
Minimal values of Chinese FDI inflows reflect this lack of large-scale industrial
development. There was no reported 2003 FDI data for Burundi, but investments in 2004
were just $20,000.'13' By 2007, this amount had grown, but only to just over $1 million. 132
126 China's National Defense in 2008.
127 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
128 "Bilateral Relations: Cote d'Ivoire," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 12
October 2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2964/>.
129 Ibid.
130 "Bilateral Relations: Burundi," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 12
October 2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2929/>.
131 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China 's Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
132 Ibid.
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China's personnel contribution to the two UN missions in Sudan represents
China's largest current deployment of personnel to a peace operation. At the end of 2008,
more than 800 Chinese peacekeepers were operating on the ground throughout Sudan. 133
Sudan is also the largest recipient of Chinese FDI of the countries where China has
deployed peace operations forces. In 2004, these investments were valued at $171.61
million, and climbed to nearly $575 million by the end of 2007.134 Much of this
investment is concentrated in the energy sector, which is discussed in greater detail later in
this section and in the case studies in chapter seven. A website describing bilateral
relations between China and Sudan, which would include a description of joint ventures
and Chinese investment in Sudan, is noticeably missing from the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs website, likely due to the sensitive political nature of Sino-Sudanese
relations. Even with the lack of specific industry related information, China's force
contributions in Sudan appear to be highly correlated with investment, but there are likely
many additional confounding variables.
China reports minimal foreign direct investment in East Timor. Between 2003 and
2007, China reported just $10,000 of investments.' 35 Much of China's recent investment
in China has been not from the commercial sector, but rather donations and construction
projects sponsored by the Chinese government. Most of these investment projects
including the construction of a $7 million presidential palace and a $6 million
headquarters building for the defense forces, began after China deployed forces there. 136
The largest of these projects was launched in 2008, when the Government of East Timor
133 China's National Defense in 2008.
134 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
135 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
136 Ian Storey, "China's Inroads into East Timor," China Brief 9, No 6. (March 2009).
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awarded the Chinese Nuclear Industry 2 2 nd Construction Company a contract to build two
heavy oil power plants and a national power grid.
China's contribution of a contingent of roughly 400 troops to the UN Interim Force
in Lebanon beginning in March 2006 is likely tied to political reasons and not Chinese
investment there.' 37 The minimal levels of Chinese investment, which amounted to just
$20,000 in 2004 and none reported in 2005 clearly suggest that other factors are at play.138
The contribution of forces to the mission marked China's first large scale deployment to
the Middle East, a region firmly outside of China's sphere of influence. The mission has a
mandate of restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of
Lebanon in ensuring the return of effective authority in the area. 139 Additionally, China
pledged to increase its force contribution in Lebanon to 1000 troops shortly after
Lieutenant Colonel Du Zhaoyu, a Chinese peacekeeper assigned as an observer to UNIFIL
was killed by an Israeli air strike in July 2006.140 This deployment potentially represents a
mission where China's participation was guided by diplomatic interests and not by trade
or investments. Statements by Chinese leaders suggest that China may have hoped to
portray itself as an actor concerned about stability in a region that had garnered significant
attention. 14 1 Indeed, UN diplomats and world leaders saw China's participation in UNIFIL
as a step toward becoming a more responsible international actor.142
137 China's initial deployment to UNIFIL included just under 200 troops, but this number eventually grew to
approximately 400 by December 2008.
138 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
139 "Resolution 425" S/RES/425 (1978). United Nations Security Council. 19 March 1978. "Resolution 426"
S/RES/426 (1978). United Nations Security Council. 19 March 1978.
140 "China ups Lebanon force to 1000," BBC News. 18 September 2006. Available online:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5355128.stm>.
141 Ibid. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated, "China is very concerned about the situation in Lebanon and
hopes it can be fundamentally resolved."
142 Ibid. Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi was visiting Beijing when China announced its decision to
contribute more forces and stated, "China is assuming more and more international responsibility."
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While a relationship between the level of foreign direct investment and the level of
Chinese peace operations participation may exist, the exact correlation is difficult to
determine. Although the presence of higher investments in the years prior to Chinese force
deployments is associated with higher level of troop contributions in countries like Sudan,
China has also deployed large numbers of forces to missions in countries where China has
minimal levels of investment, such as Lebanon. This variation suggests that Beijing looks
at a broad spectrum of factors in determining their contribution level, and not solely FDI.
The analysis also reveals growth in the level of Chinese FDI in the years following
China's first peace operations deployment in a peace operations host state. It is difficult,
however, to differentiate the factors that lead to this growth. China's international
investments increased worldwide throughout the early 2000s, and the deployment of
relatively small numbers of peacekeeping forces would not necessarily lead to increased
FDI. However, the stability brought about by peace operations may have led to improved
conditions for investment.
Bilateral Trade Agreements
Another observable indicator used in the medium-N analysis is the existence of
bilateral trade or investment agreements between China and the peace operation host state.
Bilateral agreements exist in at least fourteen of the twenty-eight cases, or in eleven
separate missions. 143 Although the existence of trade agreements is present in half of the
missions where China has contributed personnel, the agreements alone are likely an
insufficient proxy for the desire to protect Chinese trade. Simply signing a trade
agreement does not reflect the actual level of trade flows that China may want to protect,
143 The eleven missions are: UNTSO, UNIKOM, UNMIBH, UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL, MONUC, UNMEE,
UNOCI, ONUB, UNMIS, and UNAMID.
nor does the existence of a trade agreement correspond to a higher level of Chinese
participation in a peace operation in that country versus a country without a trade
agreement with China. For instance, China maintains a trade agreement with Cote
d'Ivoire, but none with Haiti. Chinese personnel, however, comprise roughly 1.7-percent




The regression analysis shows a positive trend between the presence of oil reserves
in a state and the level of Chinese contribution to peace operations there. The presence of
large proven energy resource reserves may result in higher levels of Chinese contributions
because China may hope that deploying forces will help create a stable physical and
political environment. A stable environment would ensure the safety of existing resource
extraction infrastructure and agreements, and potentially enable future access to resource
exports or extraction agreements.
If this hypothesis is correct, we should observe Chinese media or government
discussing the need to ensure security of oil or gas supply in the peace operation host
nation. While statements regarding resource supply do not definitively prove that China's
peace operation participation is motivated by resource wealth, it does imply Chinese
salience of the issue. We should also observe existing Chinese resource extraction or
exploration agreements with the peace operation host state as well as the establishment of
additional resource extraction agreements that go into effect within a year of the arrival of
Chinese personnel. The thesis assumes a one-year window for new extraction agreements
to "appear" because negotiations for concessions or exploration are generally lengthy and
may begin prior to the deployment of forces, without a finalized agreement being
established until after the mission is launched. The hypothesis would also be supported if
Chinese troop deployments are near important oil and gas extraction or transport sites in
the peace operation host nations. Troop contributing countries have significant influence
over the deployment of their personnel in UN missions, so it is not unreasonable to
assume that China specifies where its forces will operate within a given mission. 144
Evidence:
Relatively few observable implications were located for this portion of the
medium-N analysis. China became a net importer of oil in 1993.145 Therefore, Chinese
demand for foreign oil prior to 1993 is far less than it is today, leading to fewer
international resource extraction and exploration agreements. While no definitive list of
Chinese extraction agreements was located, the thesis examined printed media archives,
bilateral relationship information pages from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
websites of major Chinese energy firms for information on extraction agreements. When
no information could be found, the mission countries were generally coded as having no
resource extraction agreements with China. The lack of extractable resources in some
peace operations host states (i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the launch of missions prior to
1993 provide additional evidence that China did not have had resource extraction
agreements in many of the cases.
144 Information concerning influence of troop contributing nations over the employment of their personnel is
from an interview with a US military officer assigned to the Military Staff Committee at the US Mission to
the United Nations. Interview conducted 3 April 2009.
145 "Country Analysis Briefs: China," Energy Information Agency, US Department of Energy. August 2006:
3.
In an attempt to examine additional information on China's views of energy
security, the thesis examined English language publications by Chinese authors writing on
energy issues. There are also very few published pieces on security of energy supply that
mention stability in specific supply-side countries. A notable exception is a 2006 China
Daily article that argues that "China currently does not face an oil supply problem or oil
security concerns[,]" however tension in resource producing states like Nigeria, Sudan,
and Iran has contributed to the "current oil and gas crunch and price hikes." 146 At a
minimum, this article hints at Chinese salience of the connection between instability and
energy resource supply shocks. The Chinese government clearly recognizes the
importance of energy security and has sponsored workshops on the issue. Despite the
importance of the issue and its potential impact on China's participation in peace
operations, the dearth of publications linking security of supply concerns with specific
conflicts makes analysis difficult.
This analysis finds that resource extraction agreements, both de facto and de jure,
are present in seven of the twenty distinct missions where China has launched
peacekeeping missions since 1990.147 Interestingly, China's contributions to nearly all of
these missions begin after 2002, when the Going Out policy was announced. Not all of
China's post-2002 missions, however, are to states where China had resource extraction
agreements. China deployed forces to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in
March 2006 and to the UN Interim Administration (UNMIK) in 2004.
In three of the seven missions where resource extraction agreements exist, China
deployed its personnel in close geographic proximity to resource extraction locations. Of
146 "Sensible Measures for Energy Security," China Daily. 12 July 2006.
147 The six missions are UNMEE, UNMISET, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNMIS, UNMIT, and UNAMID.
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the four missions where Chinese forces were not observed near resource extraction sites,
two had no associated UN military map as the missions had been terminated prior to the
writing of this thesis (UNMISET and UNMEE). 14 8 It is unlikely, however, that Chinese
troops could have been deployed near extraction and processing sites during the UN
Mission of Support in East Timor as China was engaged in off-shore oil exploration.
China's contribution to the other two missions (UNMIT and UNOCI) consisted of military
observers and civilian police. UN military maps generally do not disaggregate observer
and civilian police positions by nationality as most are integrated, multi-national forces,
compared to troops and formed police units which generally maintain their existing single-
nation organizational structure. In the medium-N analysis chart, we assume that troops are
not deployed near resource extraction and processing sites in mission countries without
existing resource extraction/exploration agreements.
China's deployment of military observers to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea (UNMEE) was the first instance in the universe of cases where China contributed
personnel to a mission country where it had a resource extraction agreement. In 1997, the
Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB) and Ethiopia's Kalub Gas Share
Company signed an agreement on the production of gas in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.
Under the agreement, ZPEB would "undertake work" on eight of ten wells to allow
Ethiopia to produce diesel, kerosene, gas, and petroleum. 149 It is unclear whether the joint
Chinese-Ethiopian project was still active when China deployed its military observers to
the mission in October 2000, however ZPEB was still involved in Ethiopia as late as
148 The UN only releases maps of ongoing missions. Attempts to obtain older maps from the UN
Cartographic Office and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations were unsuccessful.
149 "Gas production accord signed with Chinese firms," Xinhua. 27 May 1997.
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2007.150 It is also unknown if the agreement provided fuel for domestic Ethiopian
consumption or export to China.
In May 2002, China deployed a contingent of civilian police officers to the UN
Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). Three months later, the Timorese
government granted the China International Petroleum and Natural Gas Company a
contract to explore offshore gas fields in the Australia-Indonesia Joint Development Area,
which includes the Bayu-Undan and Greater Sunrise Gas Fields. 151 In 2005, one year prior
to China's first contribution to the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT),
PetroChina conducted a $1.6 million seismic study of East Timor's onshore reserves, but
failed to secure an extraction agreement.152
In 2005, Sinopec, one of China's state-owned petroleum enterprises took 27-
percent ownership in Block CI-112, an oil field off the western Coast of C6te d'Ivoire that
is supposedly the site of more than 2.7 billion barrels of oil. 153 In addition to oil, C6te
d'Ivoire is also a large exporter of lumber and tropical wood. A restriction on domestic
logging enacted by the Chinese government in 1998 has driven Chinese demand for
foreign lumber. 154 In 2003 and 2004, the years prior to China's deployment of military
observers to the UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire, China exported approximately a quarter of
the log harvest from C6te d'Ivoire and Congo River Basin regions of west and central
150 In April 2007, rebel fighters attacked a ZPEB-run oil facility in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.
151 "Bilateral Relations: East Timor," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 23
October 2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2706/ >.
152 Storey, 2009: 2.
153 "Energy Profile of Western Africa," Encyclopedia of the Earth. 12 September 2007. Available online: <
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile of West_Africa>.
154 Testimony of Allan Thorton on "Chinese involvement in illegal logging and timber trade" to the US
House of Representatives Committee on International Relations. 28 July 2005. Text available online:<
http://www.eia-global.org/PDF/testimony--ChinaAfricahearing--forests--juIO5.pdf>.
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Africa."55 These numbers suggest that at least some timber was exported to China even
though there were no direct observations of Chinese timber extraction agreements with
C6te d'Ivoire.
In recent years, China has received substantial negative global attention for its
support of the Sudanese government and President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. China
has been criticized for arming and supporting al-Bashir's government, which has been
accused crimes against humanity, in exchange for access to Sudan's vast oil reserves. The
state-owned firms China National Petroleum Corporation and PetroChina maintain either
partial or full ownership over multiple oil fields, refineries and offshore exploration rights
in Sudan.156 China currently contributes military observers, troops, and civilian police to
the two UN missions in Sudan. As of December 2008, China had more peacekeepers
deployed to Sudan than to any other peace operation host nation. Chinese troops assigned
to the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Mission in the Sudan
(UNMIS) are based primarily in the cities of Nyala and Wau, close to oil fields where
China maintains partial control. Maintaining troops near oil fields helps to ensure local
stability and security. Without a monitoring force on the ground, rebels would likely have
an increased opportunity to attack oil infrastructure, potentially jeopardizing the flow of
oil to China. Rebel groups in Sudan have previously attacked Chinese owned oil fields and
155Annual Review and Assessment of the World Timber Situation 2004. Document GI-7/04. (International
Tropical Timber Organization, December 2004).
156 For a description of China's oil investments in Africa, see, Ricardo Soares de Olivera, "Making Sense of
Chinese Oil Investment in Africa," in China Returns to Africa. Chris Alden, et al., eds. (London: Hurst &
Company, 2008): 83-109.
taken oil workers hostage. 157 A more in-depth case study comparing China's troop
contributions in Sudan and non-participation in Chad is presented in chapter seven.
The case of Liberia is unique in that no official resource extraction agreement
between China and Liberia was in place prior to China's October 2003 contribution of
military observers, troops, and civilian police to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).
Instead, China appears to have been importing large amounts of Liberian timber. While
most academic and media attention on conflict resources focuses on diamonds, the illegal
export of timber undoubtedly helped to fuel the civil wars in Liberia and neighboring
Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor allegedly used timber sales to fund his government as well as
the Revolutionary United Front, which was fighting a war with the UN-backed
government in Sierra Leone.' 58 In the first six months of 2000 alone, China reportedly
imported just under half of all Liberian timber exports, worth about $13 million. 159 By
2001, China was Liberia's largest buyer of wood products, importing some $52 million
worth of logs.160 Much of the exported wood was bartered directly for arms and
ammunition in Liberian ports. 161 In 2003, the United Nations imposed sanctions on the
export of Liberian timber.' 62 While China appeared to abide by the sanctions by not
importing Liberian logs in the first half of 2004, UN maps indicate that Chinese
peacekeepers are deployed in regions close to major wood producing forests. 163 Sanctions
on Liberian timber were dropped in 2006, potentially suggesting that Chinese troops are
157 "Sudan rebels 'attack oil field,"' BBC News. 11 December 2007. Available online
:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/71 38226.stm>.
158 William Kistner, "Timber, Taylor...guns, money," The Christian Science Monitor. 23 July 2003.
159 Mike Blanchfield, "France, China keep war alive in Africa: MP: David Pratt blasts nations for blocking
UN effort to cut funds fuelling African war," The Ottawa Citizen. 7 September 2001.
160 Ibid.
161 Murl Baker et al, Conflict Timber: Dimensions of the Problem in Asia and Africa. (US Agency for
International Development, May 2003): 141-142.
162 "Resolution 1478" S/RES/1478 (2003). United Nations Security Council. 6 May 2003.
163 Thorton testimony.
deployed to regions where logging will soon recommence. As of February 2009, a PLA
medical company and engineering company are deployed in the eastern city of Zwedru, a
city surrounded by forests, while a transportation company is deployed to Liberia's
capital, the port city of Monrovia. 164
Although gathering data may not be feasibly, future analysis could attempt to make
the medium-N analysis more robust by quantifying the extraction and exploration
agreements, potentially by the size of concessions or annual production from extraction
sites. This would allow future research to determine if a higher degree of extraction or
potential extraction leads to higher levels of troop contribution.
Diplomatic Influence
Hypothesis:
China is likely to deploy peace operations personnel to nations where China hopes
to establish diplomatic ties or to nations where China is attempting to significantly
improve its diplomatic standing. This suggests that the promise of deploying troops can be
used either as an incentive for peace operation host states seeking stability or as an attempt
by China to gain diplomatic recognition in a post-conflict environment. In both of these
cases, the peace operation host state must be willing to shift its diplomatic recognition
from Taipei to Beijing, as diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China
and any other nation are conditional on the severance of ties with Taiwan and the
recognition of only "one" China. In an earlier era, before China began contributing
personnel to UN missions, Beijing used its position on the Security Council to veto the
164 PLA positions from United Nations Map No. 4211, Rev UNMIL. Rev 19. United Nations Department of
Field Support, Cartographic Section. February 2009. Ir J.W.A Jansen, Timber Trees in Liberia. (Monrovia:
University of Liberia, 1974) discusses location of various tree species in Liberia. Available online at:
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/ae893e/ae893e00.pdf>
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extension of peacekeeping operations due to peace operation host state relations with
Taiwan. In January 1997, China vetoed the extension of a peacekeeping mission in
Guatemala, and in February 1999, China voted against extending a mission in Macedonia.
In both of these cases, host state relations with Taiwan ostensibly led to China's vetoes. 165
Given the relative importance of the one-China policy in Beijing's diplomatic strategy,
China use peace operations participation as a diplomatic tool.
If this mechanism is true, we should observe China using the promise of deploying
peace operations forces as a diplomatic bargaining chip. For instance, China should delay
deploying or renewing troop deployments until the peace operation host nation breaks
diplomatic ties with the Republic of China in exchange for a Chinese peacekeeping
contingent.
If China uses peacekeeping as a diplomatic tool, there should also be a higher level
of personnel contribution to missions located in countries that China has proclaimed to be
strategically important. Deploying Chinese personnel would allow for enhanced stability
in these regions and could potentially limit the ability of other actors to exert influence
there. 166  A potential shortcoming of this observable implication is that Chinese
government and media sources may not openly name the nations that they deem to be
strategically important. The number of high level diplomatic visits at the minister level or
above in the two years prior to China's first contribution of personnel to a mission may
serve as a proxy if there are an insufficient number of statements concerning the strategic
importance of peace operation host states.
165 China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping. (New York: International Crisis Group, 2009): 17-18.
166 In 2007, a Central Party School publication stated that China's participation in UN peacekeeping gives
Taiwan "less room to breathe." Zhao Lei, "Come for Peace - Analysis of China's Peacekeeping Operations
in Africa," Central Party School, Foreign Policy Commentary, no. 94 (February 2007) cited in China's




There are five cases where China has contributed personnel to missions in
countries that recognized the Republic of China or in countries that established diplomatic
ties with Beijing in the two years prior to China's first personnel deployment there. Two
of these missions were in Liberia, another two were UN operations in East Timor, and the
final case was China's contribution of personnel to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH). The Liberian and East Timorese cases are addressed in this section,
however, the case of Haiti is analyzed in greater detail in chapter 8. The contribution of a
Chinese formed police unit to the mission in Haiti represents the first time China has
deployed a sizeable force to a country with which it does not maintain diplomatic ties.
China has contributed personnel to two UN missions in Liberia. Each of these
deployments coincides with distinct events in Sino-Liberian diplomatic relations. The
People's Republic of China first established diplomatic ties with Liberia on 17 February
1977. Beijing and Monrovia maintained relations until 10 October 1989 when Liberian
President Samuel Doe signed "The Joint Communique on the Reestablishment of
Diplomatic Relations" with Taiwan. 167 On 10 August 1993, Beijing reestablished
diplomatic ties with Liberia, making Monrovia the only state to recognize both Chinas. 168
Just three months later, China deployed military observers to the UN Mission in Liberia
(UNOMIL). Between November 1993 and September 1997, China contributed thirty-three
military observers to the mission. The mission's mandate ended in September 1997.
167 "Bilateral Relations: Liberia," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 26 August
2003. Available online: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/3024/>.
168 Phillip Liu, "Cross-Strait Scramble for Africa: A Hidden Agenda in China-Africa Cooperation,"
Harvard Asia Quarterly. 5, No 2 (Spring 2001).
UNOMIL was replaced by a post-conflict peace-building support offices intended to
strengthen and harmonize UN peace-building efforts. 169 Coincidentally, Liberian President
Charles Taylor announced his country's recognition of "two Chinas" on 5 September
1997. Beijing suspended diplomatic ties with Liberia four days later.
China's second mission in Liberia began in October 2003, when China pledged to
contribute roughly 500 troops, observers, and civilian police to the UN Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL). The mission was established on 19 September 2003 with a mandate that
included monitoring ceasefire agreements, assisting with the disarmament of ex-
combatants, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 170 China allegedly
threatened to block a $250 million budget for the peacekeeping operation if Liberia did
not switch its diplomatic allegiance. 171 On 12 October, Liberia announced that it would
break diplomatic ties with Taiwan and reestablish relations with Beijing. 172 Taiwan's
Foreign Minister, Eugene Chien, accused China of using its influence in the UN along
with the promise of reconstruction assistance to establish ties with Liberia. 173 By the end
of October, China had deployed four troops to UNMIL, likely as an advance team. By
December, over 70 Chinese personnel were in Liberia, with the remainder of the force
arriving in early 2004.174
East Timor was officially recognized as an independent nation in May 2002. In
the months surrounding East Timor's independence, Chinese politicians and diplomats
169 "Liberia-UNOMIL Background" United Nations Department ofPeacekeeping Operations. 2001.
Available online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomilS.htm>
170 "Resolution 1509" S/RES/1509 (2003). United Nations Security Council. 19 September 2003.
171 Huang Tai-lin, "Taiwan says goodbye to another ally," Taipei Times. 13 October 2003.
172 "Taiwan plays down Liberia blow," BBC News. 13 October 2003. Available online:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3 1863334.stm>.
173 Ibid.
174 Mark Doyle, "China peacekeepers in Liberia," BBC News. 20 January 2004. Available online:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/341 2317.stm>.
made numerous public statements pledging their support to the new state, and reinforcing
China's commitment to developing "good neighborly relations" with East Timor. 175
China deployed its first civilian police contingent to the UN Transitional Administration
in East Timor (UNTAET) in January 2000 and a second contingent in May 2002 to the
UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). China also contributed military
observers and police to the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste in October 2006, but
this was more than four years after East Timor gained recognition as an independent
nation. China may have contributed peace operations personnel to missions in East Timor
to demonstrate Beijing's support for the new nation and to assure that the Timorese
government would recognize Beijing rather than Taipei. China's support for peace
operations in East Timor was coupled with significant financial and developmental
assistance.
Both East Timor and Liberia established diplomatic ties with the People's
Republic of China shortly after China promised to contribute peace operations forces.
Certainly, deploying peace operations personnel was not the sole factor that led these
states to recognize Beijing, as both states also received large economic aid packages.
While Taipei and Beijing both practice dollar diplomacy, using large grants to attract
diplomatic partners, China's ability to deploy peacekeepers to states seeking stability
provides it with an additional advantage over Taiwan that will be unable to contribute
personnel to peace operations as long as it remains a non-UN member state.
Public Statements on Host State Strategic Importance
Relying on published media and government press releases that proclaim the
strategic importance of a country may significantly under represent the number of nations
175 "Chinese foreign minister holds talks with East Timorese counterpart," Xinhua. 18 May 2002.
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that China views as strategically important. Statements made by government officials in
private settings will not make it to public presses, leaving few observable implications for
researchers. A search of archival content databases for the term "strategic" combined with
China and the peace operation host state name in the two years prior to the deployment of
Chinese forces reveals just four observations. Admittedly, terms or phrases other than
"strategic" can capture the same concept, potentially leading the omission of published
reports describing the strategic value of a given peace operation host state.
Given the conditions described above, there are four observable cases where
Chinese media sources discuss the strategic importance of specific peace operation host
states. The four missions are, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the UN Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS), and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Both Cambodia and
East Timor were described as important due to their geographic proximity. 176 The
importance of Sino-Sudanese ties was mentioned only in relation to China's goal of
establishing strategic partnerships with African nations. During an April 2005 meeting
with his Sudanese counterpart, Hu Jintao stated that, "the Chinese government attaches
importance to the development of relations with Sudan, and is willing to work with Sudan
to push forward bilateral friendly and cooperative ties to a new stage." 177 China deployed
relatively large missions to each of these missions, however a dearth of public discussion
on the strategic importance of states greatly limits the value of any apparent relationships
between public statements of strategic importance and the level of China's peace
operations participation.
176 For an example of the importance China attaches to nations in its periphery, see Richard C. Hottelet,
"The Power Game in Southeast Asia," Christian Science Monitor. I May 1992.
177 "Chinese, Sudanese leaders agree on further expanding ties," Xinhua. 23 April 2005.
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Significant Diplomatic Visits
Analysis of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports and newspaper articles
indicates that exchanges of high-level officials occurred in at least twenty-one of the
twenty-eight mission countries. This includes visits by Chinese officials at the minister
level and above to a peace operation host state in the two years prior to China's first
personnel contribution, as well as visits by host state officials to China. Diplomatic
exchanges between China and peace operation host states occurred in seventeen of the
twenty-two missions where China has participated. The five cases with no recorded visits
are missions in countries with which China did not maintain diplomatic ties in the two
years preceding its first troop contribution. This includes two missions in Liberia, a
mission in Kosovo, a mission in Haiti, and a mission in the Western Sahara. Given the
lack of variation in the number of diplomatic visits between mission countries where
China has deployed larger number personnel and those where China's contribution is
limited to small numbers of observers, this observable implication is perhaps not an ideal
indicator for diplomatic interests. This is possibly because visits include not only trips
made by foreign ministers and presidents, but also exchanges of ministers of defense,
agriculture, and commerce that often coincide with the signing of trade and assistance
agreements. These visits also include host state official attendance at large conferences,
such as the conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, in China.
Conclusion
The analysis above examines various potential drivers across the twenty-two
missions and twenty-eight mission countries where China has contributed peace
operations personnel. Examination of qualitative evidence finds that discussion of
economic development and the presence of Chinese FDI and joint ventures are present in
a significant percentage of cases where China contributes forces. Resource extraction
agreements with peace operation host states are also present in seven of the fifteen
missions where China began contributing troops after 2000.178 These trends suggest that
strategic drivers play some role in influencing Chinese peace operation participation.
More complete information, possibly obtained by broadening the sources of information,
would greatly strengthen this analysis by eliminating the need to infer and assume so
many observable implications.
While trends appear to indicate a realist motivator for participation, China has
contributed personnel to missions with seemingly few observable implications of strategic
value. Six of the fifteen mission countries where China began contributing personnel after
2000 have less than four positive observable implications. There were only three positive
observable implications in the case of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET), two in Eritrea prior to China's contributions to the UN Mission in Ethiopia
and Eritrea (UNMEE), two prior to the deployment to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL), and just one positive observable implication in the case of the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and in the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo
(UNMIK). The observable implication missing in the UNTAET case that is present in the
two later missions in East Timor, UNMISET and UNMIT, is the existence of a resource
extraction agreement. It is possible that in the case of UNTAET, China sought to capture a
new diplomatic in an early stage of East Timor's transition to independent statehood,
rather than gain access to resource reserves. The smaller number of positive observable
178 Of these fifteen missions, nine were established after 2000. China's contributions in the post-2000 period
include deployments to six missions that were launched before 2000.
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implications in Eritrea may be balanced by the presence of four observable implications in
Ethiopia, once again suggesting that China may determine their personnel contributions
based on the strategic value of only one state in a multistate peace operation. The
deployment of a relatively large and well-armed police contingent despite the lack of
significant positive observable implications make China's participation in MINUSTAH an
ideal case study in chapter seven of this thesis.
Although cross case analysis provides valuable insight, examining trends within
individual missions sheds additional light on the factors that lead to variation in the level
of Chinese contributions. To perform this analysis, the total number of observable
implications in each mission is summed. Each positive observation (coded with a Y in
Table 5) and any significant diplomatic visits receive a value of "1." Negative observable
implications receive a value of 0. Unfortunately missing observations cannot be included
in the sum, which degrades the effectiveness of the analysis. Still, this case level analysis
reveals two potentially related trends. First, the sum of observable implications is higher in
missions launched after 2000 than it is in earlier missions. Secondly, there seems to be a
weak correlation between a higher total number of observable implications and Chinese
contributions of troops, which generally indicates larger Chinese contributions. However,
since higher personnel contributions seem correlated with more observable implications,
higher force contributions may be the result of China's enhanced post-2000 participation
in peace operations. Alternatively, since the observable implications rely in part on
examining Chinese newspaper and media archives, it is possible that enhanced press
coverage or improved digitization of documents after 2000 skewed the findings.
Most mission countries to which China deployed troops prior to 2000 have a total
of one or two positive observable implications, whereas missions launched after 2000
generally have at least four positive observable implications. The greater number of
observable implications in post-2000 cases suggests that strategic motivations have had a
greater influence on China's more recent peace operations participation than in earlier
cases. The lack of observable indicators in pre-2000 cases along with small deployments
primarily of military observers may indicate that China's participation in earlier peace
operations was not driven by a realist desire to maximize access to strategically important
commercial and diplomatic interests in peace operation host states. Instead, China may
have been attempting to secure for itself an image as a responsible actor during much of
the 1990s.
Table 6. Type of Chinese Forces Deployed
Mission
UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization
UNIKOM: UN Irac-Kuwait Observation Mission
MINURSO: UN Mission for the Referendum in
Westem Sahara
China Start
I April 1990 1 X
I April 1991 1 X
September 1991
UNTAC: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia March 1992 X
ONUMOZ: UN Operation in Mozambique June 1993 X
UNOMIL: UN Observer Mission in Liberia November 1993 X
UNOMSIL: UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone July 1998 X
UNAMSIL: UN Mission in Sierra Leone October 1999 X
UNTAET: UN Transitional Administration in East January 2000 X
Timor
UNMEE: UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea October 2000 X
UNMIBH: UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina January 2001 X
MONUC: UN Organization Mission in the DRC April 2001 X X
UNMISET: UN Mission of Support in East Timor May 2002 X
UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia October 2003 X X X
UNOCI: UN Mission in Cote d'lvoire March 2004 X
UNMIK: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo April 2004 X
MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti June 2004 X
ONUB: UN Operation in Burundi June 2004 X
UNMIS: UN Mission in the Sudan May 2005 X X X
UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon March 2006 X X
UNMIT: UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste October 2006 X X
UNAMID: AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur December 2007 X X
* During the initial phase of UNIKOM only, the mission included five infrantry companies
^ Mission mandate included 5 military liaison personnel
Data Sources: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations mission websites, China's National Detense
in 2008.
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Table 6, above, shows the type of forces China contributed to each of the twenty-
two missions where it participated. Cells shaded in grey signify that the mission mandate
did not authorize or request the contribution of certain categories of forces. For instance,
the civilian police cell for the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is shaded
grey since the mission mandate did not call for civilian police. As described earlier, most
of China's early participation in peace operations was in the form of military observers.
Even when given the opportunity to deploy police and troops, China elected to contribute
only small numbers of observers. It was not until 2000 that China deployed its first
contingent of civilian police, and 2001 when China deployed its troops to a peace
operation for the first time since its deployment of engineering troops to Cambodia in
1992 as part of UNTAC. While the deployment of larger force contingents and the
decision to contribute troops to more missions could represent China's growing
acceptance of UN peace operations and international institutions, as argued by some
analysts, the increase largely coincides with greater observable implications of strategic
interests in the post-2000 period. Small deployments of observers to key UN missions,
such as UNTSO, prior to 2000 were well suited for building China's image as a
responsible actor. In fact, China began participating in peace operations in April 1990, less
than a year after the international community condemned China for killing civilians during
the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989. Larger deployments better suited for
exerting Chinese influence began in 2000, as China began its peaceful development.
Chapter Seven
Case Studies
The statistical analysis in chapter four reveals few substantive and significant
trends in China's peace operation participation, suggesting that Chinese decision makers
determine participation on a case-by-case basis. The medium-N chapter offers a more in-
depth examination of the twenty missions where China has contributed personnel, and
again offers few significant trends. Instead, it reveals characteristics that appear in
multiple cases where China has deployed peace operations personnel. The analysis finds
discussion of economic development in eight mission countries, the presence of joint
ventures and Chinese direct investment in eleven, shifts in diplomatic recognition in five
mission countries, and resource extraction agreements in six. In light of what appears to be
an ad hoc peace operation participation calculus influenced by a mix of diplomatic,
geopolitical, and economic drivers, this thesis analyzes three cases to better examine how
various factors influence China's decision to contribute personnel to UN peace operations.
The three cases analyzed in this thesis are the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT),
and the two missions in Sudan: the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and the AU/UN
Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Haiti is selected for case level analysis because of
the sizeable and well-armed Chinese deployment there, despite the nation's seemingly low
strategic value to China and the lack of diplomatic ties between the two nations. Haiti is
also one of six mission countries that had just one positive observable implication in the
medium-N analysis. Deployments to the other five mission countries with one positive
observable implication consisted either of military observers or far smaller numbers of
civilian police, compared to a 125-member formed police unit in Haiti. 179 Haiti is analyzed
as an individual case that examines the diplomatic drivers that appear to have been the key
motivators in China's decision to contribute forces.
Sudan has the highest number of positive observable implications in the medium-N
study and is home to two United Nations missions where China has contributed significant
numbers of personnel. In December 2008, more Chinese personnel were deployed to
Sudan than to any other peace operation host state. Additionally, China's diplomatic and
commercial involvement with Sudan has garnered significant media and political attention
in the west. Therefore, a case study of China's peace operation deployments in Sudan may
inform concerned policymakers. China's participation in the two missions in Sudan are
examined vis-a-vis China's nonparticipation in MINURCAT in a comparative case study
that relies on the method of difference. Despite not sharing all of the characteristics of the
missions in Sudan, MINURCAT is selected as a case for comparison because both
Sudanese missions and MINURCAT occurred in the same geographic area, were launched
in roughly the same time period, and were launched primarily to respond to conflicts
stemming from fighting in Sudan. Additionally, MINURCAT is the only peace operation
in Africa launched after 2000 where China chose not to contribute personnel.
Haiti
China's decision to deploy a peacekeeping contingent to the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is perhaps the most perplexing case of Chinese peace
179 China deployed military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (Jordan and Lebanon both
had one positive observable implication), the UN Operation in Mozambique, the UN Observer Mission in
Liberia, and deployed civilian police to the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo. See Table 5, page 63, for
a chart of the observable implications in all mission countries where China has deployed personnel.
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operation participation. Haiti has virtually no extractable resources or significant industry
and offers a relatively small market for Chinese goods. Additionally, unlike the host states
of the twenty-one other missions where China has deployed personnel, Haiti does not
maintain diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. However, in June
2004, China deployed roughly 125 civilian police officers to MINUSTAH. Over the
course of the next four years, China deployed nearly 1000 peacekeepers to Haiti, with
roughly 140 Chinese personnel in Haiti at any given time.180 At the time of this writing,
Chinese participation in MINUSTAH continues. This case study begins by offering a brief
background of MINUSTAH and the composition of UN forces assigned to the mission,
with special attention given to Chinese forces. The thesis then examines Chinese and
Haitian media, Chinese government press releases, primary sources from the United
Nations, and historical and policy analysis to demonstrate that China's personnel
contribution to MINUSTAH was driven primarily by China's desire to develop a means of
diplomatic control and influence over the Haitian government. The case study then
explains why China deployed the type of forces it did and concludes by offering
predictions on Chinese behavior in future missions of a similar nature.
Mission Background
M1NUSTAH was established in April 2004 by UN Security Council Resolution
1542. The UN mission replaced the US-led Multinational Interim Force that was deployed
to Haiti in March 2004 after tension surrounding the contested 2000 election of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide erupted into violence.181 An armed rebellion against Aristide's
government peaked in February 2004, when the National Revolutionary Front for the
180 China's National Defense in 2008: Appendix III.
181 See Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 (London: Center on International Cooperation,
2008) for additional background on MINUSTAH.
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Liberation of Haiti took control of Gonaives, the nation's fourth largest city. 182 The rebels
were followers of Buteur Metayer, who was attempting to avenge the murder of his
brother, Amiot Metayer. 183 Amiot, the leader of the pro-Aristide Cannibal Army, a gang
that harassed government opponents, was brutally murdered in September 2003.184 Some
opposition politicians believed that Aristide was responsible for the murder because
Metyaer had potentially damaging information about the government. 85 By the end of
February, Metayer's rebels along with members of other groups had advanced within
miles of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince. In the early morning of 29 February, Aristide
resigned and fled to Africa, in an escape plan formulated by the United States
government. 186 In response to a request for assistance issued by the interim Haitian
government the same day, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1529.
Resolution 1529 authorized the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force for a period
of not more than three months to "contribute to a secure and stable environment in the
Haitian capital and elsewhere in the country" by facilitating the provision of humanitarian
assistance and establishing law and order.187 A force of 1000 United States Marines along
with Canadian, Chilean, and French troops operating as Combined Joint Task Force Haiti
(CJTF-Haiti) arrived later that week with the task of executing the mandate outlined in
Resolution 1529.188
182 Estanislao Oziewicz, "Haiti's rebellion and its leaders," The Globe and Mail (Canada). 25 February
2004: A17.
183 Ibid.
184 "Police, protestors clash over killing of gang leader: Haitian president losing support. Some suggest
government was involved in slaying because of fugitive's knowledge," Associated Press. 25 September
2003.
185 Ibid.
186 David Adams, "Aristide's last days," St. Petersburg Times (Florida). 28 February 2006:1A.
187 "Resolution 1529". S/RES/1529 (2004). United Nations Security Council. 29 February 2004.
188 Joseph Napoli, "The United States Role," in Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti, eds
John T. Fishel and Andr6s Sienz (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007): 42.
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MINUSTAH was established by Security Council Resolution 1542 on 30 April
2004 to replace the Multinational Interim Force with a long-term stabilization force. The
initial six-month mission mandate called for a civilian and military mission consisting of a
maximum of 1622 civilian police and a military component of 6700 troops.' 89 The mission
was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing the use of military force to
execute its mandate of ensuring a secure and stable environment, supporting the political
process, and promoting human rights. 190 MINUSTAH was specifically tasked with
assisting the transitional Haitian government in supporting and training the National
Police, assisting in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups,
protecting UN personnel and assets, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of
physical violence.' 9 Additionally, the mission was responsible for supporting and
fostering democratic governance by providing administrative assistance to the Transitional
Government as well as monitoring the human rights situation. 192 On 1 June 2004,
authority was transferred from the Multinational Interim Force to MINUSTAH.
At the start of the mission in June 2004, China was one of twenty-two troop
contributing countries to MINUSTAH. Contributors included countries from around the
world including nine from the Americas, six from Africa, four from Europe, one from the
Middle East, and two from Asia.' 93 More than ninety-seven percent of the 2148 personnel
deployed came from Latin and North American nations, with Brazil contributing more
than half of the personnel initially assigned to the mission. The initial dominance of
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Western Hemisphere forces on the mission was largely the result of planning for the
Multinational Interim Force in which the United States had made informal calls to
potential troop contributors to facilitate the deployment of personnel. 194 Indeed, at the start
of the mission, Multinational Interim Force participants Canada and Chile were among the
largest troop contributors. 195 At the time, China's contribution was just one civilian police
officer who was likely deployed as an advanced reconnaissance team to prepare for the
arrival of additional Chinese forces.' 96 By October 2004, an entire Chinese Formed Police
Unit was on the ground in Port-au-Prince. 197 In the roughly four years between the launch
of the mission and December 2008, the number of troop contributing countries and troops
increased to forty-seven and 9,089, respectively, with China providing a 143-member
police unit.
China's Participation
MINUSTAH is an outlier that shares little in common with the other missions
where China has contributed large numbers of personnel. Haiti produces no critical
resources, has minimal trade with China, hosts a virtually nonexistent Overseas Chinese
population, and is geographically distant from China. Despite Haiti's seemingly low
strategic value to China, Beijing has maintained a formed police unit of roughly 150
troops in Port-au-Prince since the summer of 2004. Given Haiti's low strategic value,
why does China deploy such a heavily armed force that is China's fifth largest mission in
terms of personnel, of the twenty-two missions where China has contributed personnel?
194 Napoli, 2007: 40.
195 June 2004 Monthly Summary of Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations.
196 Interview with US military officer assigned to the Military Staff Committee of the US Mission to the UN,
4 April 2009. The officer described the planning and force generation process of UN peace operations.
197 October 2004 Monthly Summary of Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 30 October 2004. Available online: <
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2004/October2004_4.pdf>. Accessed 5 May 2009.
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China claims that its participation in MINUSTAH was guided by the norm-based
principles discussed earlier in this thesis and by China's "active stance...in safeguarding
world peace and regional stability." 198 At a press conference prior to the deployment of the
Chinese police unit to Haiti, Chinese officials specifically cited the principle of respect for
national sovereignty, the principle of neutrality, prior agreement to the peace operation,
and the preferred use of negotiations instead of coercion and force as the guiding
principles behind China's peace operations deployments. 199 This explanation omits any
form of realist driver and paints China as participating in peace operations as long as these
conditions are met. Given the absence of any significant economic interests or extractable
resources in Haiti, it may initially appear that China's participation is largely, as the
Chinese government claims, a means of demonstrating its position as a responsible actor
in the UN Security Council and the international community.200
As described in the medium-N analysis, there is minimal Chinese direct
investment, bilateral trade, resources, and a negligible overseas Chinese population in
Haiti. However, Haiti is one of twenty-three nations that diplomatically recognize the
Republic of China, and the only peace operation host state among Taiwan's diplomatic
partners. China may therefore seek to use its participation in MINUSTAH as a means of
exerting influence over Haiti's foreign policy or to demonstrate Beijing's willingness to
contribute government personnel to a state with which it does not maintain diplomatic ties.
China has previously used support for peace operations as a coercive diplomatic tool in
198 Speech by Tan Jun, Director of the Peacekeeping Division of the Ministry of Public Security Foreign
Affairs Department in Chinese, at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center. 29 September 2004.




shaping or punishing the actions of states that maintained diplomatic relations with
Taiwan.
China has a history of threatening to use its veto power to block the establishment
or extension of peacekeeping missions when peace operation host states appear to be
strengthening ties with the Republic of China. In February 1996, after Haiti invited
Taiwan's Vice-President to its presidential inauguration, China held up the extension of
the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The visit was the first high-level trip of a Republic of
China official to Haiti in more than twenty years, and was intended to "reinforce the
already cordial ties" between the two countries. 2 01 The visit was viewed as a provocative
move by Beijing, which then refused to approve a resolution to extend the UNMIH
mandate. The initial draft resolution would have scaled down the operation to 2,500 troops
for four additional months, however Chinese diplomats stated they would approve no
more than 1,500 total personnel.20 2 In response to China's demands, a group of Latin
American and Caribbean nations, including Cuba, appealed to the Security Council to end
Chinese obstruction of the proposed extension of the mission.203 China eventually agreed
to a four-month extension with 1,200 troops and 300 civilian police officers. 204 Western
diplomats criticized China's actions claiming that, "the Chinese held this peacekeeping
mission hostage to send a political message on Taiwan, putting the mission in jeopardy
and a UN success at risk....[It was] especially galling because China portrays itself as the
champion of the downtrodden and a leader of the developing nations, which it stiffed
201 "Vice-President Li arrives in Haiti for four-day official visit," Central News Agency-Taipei. 6 February
1996.
202 "UN Peace Force in Haiti May End Due to Chinese Objections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 28 February
1996.
203 Barbara Crossette, "Latin Nations at UN Insist China Change Stand on Haiti," New York Times. 24
February 1996.
204 Barbara Crossette, "UN Mission to Haiti is Reprieved," New York Times. 1 March 1996.
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throughout." 2 05 In December 1996, China along with Russia insisted that UNMIH be
terminated. The Chinese representative to the UN Security Council, Qin Huasun, argued
that the mission should be terminated due to enhanced Haitian law enforcement
capabilities and the need for economic reconstruction rather than peacekeeping.2 06 While
China's calls for termination of this mission do not appear to be directly associated with a
provocative act by the Haitian government, they demonstrate China's lack of full support
to a mission in a peace operation host state that recognizes Taiwan.
China has also used its veto power to block proposed UN peacekeeping missions
in countries other than Haiti. In January 1997, China vetoed a UN mission in Central
America due to Guatemala's diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. China's
representative to the Security Council stated that the veto was "not a situation we would
have liked to see. It was caused entirely by the erroneous acts of the Government of
Guatemala... [which]for four consecutive years, unscrupulously supported activities aimed
at splitting China at the United Nations....It was furthermore bent on inviting, in disregard
of the solemn warnings of the Chinese Government, the authorities of Taiwan to the
signing ceremony of the peace Agreement in Guatemala, thereby providing them with a
venue for secessionist activities against China." 207 China offered to reconsider the
authorization of the deployment of military observers to Guatemala if the Government of
Guatemala "moves to remove the obstacles." China approved the mission ten days later,
even though Guatemala maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan.20 8 China also vetoed a
205 Ibid.
206 UN Security Council Document S/PV.3721. 5 December 1996.
207 UN Security Council Document S/PV.3730. 10 January 1997.
208 UN Security Council Document S/PV.3732. 20 January 1997.
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proposed extension to the UNPREDEP, the UN force protecting Macedonia's borders,
after that country established diplomatic ties with Taiwan in January 1997.209
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan responded to Chinese participation in
MINUSTAH by accusing Beijing of using the extension of the mission as "leverage to
strengthen its relations with the Haitian government." The press release blames China for
using the "extension issue to try to stop our senior government officials from attending the
inauguration of Mr. Rene Preval as President of the Republic of Haiti... [and for]
boycott[ing] the extension appeal several times during discussions in the United Nations
Security Council to show its displeasure over the Representative to Haiti speaking on
Taiwan's behalf at the UN General Committee." 210 Despite these issues, the Government
of Taiwan insists that its ties with Haiti remain strong and that "Haiti has on countless
occasions reiterated its unswerving commitment to relations with the Taiwan
government." 211
Interestingly, Taiwan focuses much of its criticism of MINUSTAH on China's
threat to not vote for an extension of the mission mandate, rather than on the contribution
of Chinese personnel. Perhaps this signals that Taipei views China's use of its Security
Council veto power to coerce states aligned with Taiwan as a more pressing concern than
the mere presence of Chinese personnel on the ground. In the case of Haiti, this is a logical
position for Taiwan as the Chinese FPU makes up only a small fraction of the force and
their deployment offers China little additional leverage over the Haitian government.
209 UN Security Council Document S/PV.3981. 25 February 1999, cited in Gill and Reilly (2000): 57.210 "Frequently Asked Questions," Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available online:
<http://74.125.47.1 3 2 /search?q=cache:881SuFW5clsJ:www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp%3FxItem%3D3382




Additionally, China's interference in earlier missions in Haiti, Guatemala, and Macedonia
demonstrates China's ability to make political statements when voting for or vetoing
peace operations. Given China's ability to coerce decision makers and shape the Haitian
policy through its veto power alone, China appears to gain little diplomatic advantage
from its deployment of personnel other than making a political statement that it is willing
to have a physical presence in a country that maintains diplomatic ties with Taipei.
Chinese MINUSTAH Force Structure Analysis
China publicly states that the deployment of a Chinese police unit to Haiti was a
result of a United Nations request.212 It is important to note, however, that the Military
Planning Services division of the UN Office of Military Affairs (OMA) generally issues
force generation requests for peace operations to all member states, who then offer their
personnel and assets in exchange for payment by the UN.213 Force requests are typically
not made to specific members states. This suggests that in the case of MINUSTAH, China
chose to offer its personnel in response to a general force request issued by the OMA.
While the force requirement lists are not made public, analysis of MINUSTAH mission
maps from the United Nations Cartographic Office reveals the number and types of units
requested by the OMA. The OMA likely requested at least nine formed police units along
with numerous infantry units supported by aviation, medical, and engineering units.2 14
Notably, China provides forces for just one formed police unit. The lack of additional
Chinese forces is discussed later in this section.
212 Speech by Tan Jun, Director of the Peacekeeping Division of the Ministry of Public Security Foreign
Affairs Department in Chinese, at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center. 29 September 2004.
Langang, China. Available online <http://ipc.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zjhd/tl63726.htm>. Accessed 5 March 2009.213 Interview with US military officer assigned to the Military Staff Committee of the US Mission to the UN,
4 April 2009.214 United Nations Map No. 4224, Rev 23. MINUSTAH. (United Nations Department of Field Support,
Cartographic Section, March 2009).
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China's mission to Haiti is a civilian police deployment of anti-riot police officers
from China's Ministry of Public Safety (MPS). The 1.7 million officers of the MPS
(renmin jingcha) fall under the control of the State Council and are primarily responsible
for domestic law enforcement operations. 215 In China, duties of the MPS include domestic
patrol, detective work, traffic enforcement, anti-terrorism, and anti-riot response. In 2001,
the MPS ordered major cities to establish anti-riot forces of at least 300 personnel, or 200
in provincial capitals. 216 Personnel selected from these anti-riots units make up the bulk of
China's force in Haiti.217 The personnel selected for the mission in Haiti ostensibly
represent the elite of the MPS. Candidates are required to have at least an associate's
degree, three years of work experience in public security, and proficiency in oral and
written English, along with a variety of other health and knowledge requirements. 218 Upon
selection, members of the team attend a three-month training that focuses on tactics,
command, Haitian geography and culture, and international law. Additionally,
commanders and selected riot police officers received English and French training, while
the bulk of the force was took part only in English training. 2 19 The rigorous selection
requirements and the in-depth pre-deployment reflects the importance China places in
using its peace operations forces to positively represent China and "win hearts and minds"
in peace operation host states.
The deployment to Haiti represents the first and only time China has deployed an
integrated riot police unit on a UN mission. When deploying civilian police on UN peace
215 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 16-18.
216 "China to establish anti-riot police force," Xinhua Online, 27 January 2001. cited in Blasko, 2006.
217 The initial deployment included personnel from the riot police units of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and
Chongqing. Speech by Tan Jun, 29 September 2004.218 Speech by Tan Jun, Director of the Peacekeeping Division of the Ministry of Public Security Foreign
Affairs Department in Chinese, at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center. 29 September 2004.
Langang, China. Available online <http://ipc.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zjhd/t163726.htm>. Accessed 5 March 2009.
219 Speech by Tan Jun, 29 September 2004.
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operations, China traditionally sends smaller numbers of officers who are then integrated
into teams made up of personnel from other contributing states.220 The Chinese riot police
team in Haiti, however, is a formed police unit (FPU), a specialized single nation
contingent that is generally tasked with supplying rapid response and high-risk police
capabilities that require a high degree of unit cohesiveness. 221 Deployed FPUs often
provide security support to local law enforcement agencies by participating in show of
force missions and joint patrols and training, protect UN personnel and facilities and other
key individuals and facilities designated by the Special Representative of the Secretary
General in a peace operation host state, assist in crowd and riot control, and carry out high
risk arrests.222 When China first deployed its FPU, it was one of two FPUs in Haiti. Today,
China's force in Haiti is one of nine FPUs. Other FPU contributors to Haiti are India,
Nepal, Nigeria, and Senegal with one FPU each, and Jordan and Pakistan, which each
maintain two FPUs in Haiti.223 The Chinese force is deployed in Port-Au-Prince, along
with six other FPUs.
China's decision to deploy a formed police unit is a significant deviation from its
past peace operations deployments. As mentioned earlier, China's police deployments to
peace operations have traditionally been relatively small contingents of civilian police,
while the majority of large Chinese deployments have consisted of non-combat People's
Liberation Army troops such as engineers, transportation specialists, and medical
personnel. Analysis of UN maps reveals that MINUSTAH forces are composed almost
220 Based on comparison of Chinese list of contributions published in China's National Defense in 2008 and
UN mission maps which list non-formed police units as "CIVPOL" units.
221 Formed Police Unit Tasks. (International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, 2007): 1-9.
222 Ibid: 1-9.
223 United Nations Map No. 4224, Rev 23. MINUSTAH. (United Nations Department of Field Support,
Cartographic Section, March 2009)
111
entirely of formed police and infantry units.224 While China could have potentially
contributed engineers or medical personnel, as it typically does, these support units are
manned by Latin American militaries.225 As of early 2009, the two engineer companies
assigned to MINUSTAH were manned by Chile and Brazil, the sole medical unit was run
by Argentina and the three aviation units were provided by Chile, Argentina, and
Uruguay.226 Chile was a large contributor to the Multinational Interim Force while Brazil
served a key role in the formation and leadership of MINUSTAH.22 7 The position of these
two nations in the history and leadership of MINUSTAH may have allowed them greater
access to the support units that China may have otherwise filled. The remaining support
units were two aviation flights and an aviation squadron based in Port-au-Prince. 228 China
has yet to contribute aviation units to any peace operation, despite calls from the Under-
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations urging China to contribute force enablers
such as aviation transport units. 229 It is questionable whether China would be willing or
able to contribute helicopters or transport aircraft to a mission so far from China. China
has relatively few military helicopters. The People's Liberation Army Air Force operates
less than 100 transport and utility helicopters, while the Army operates roughly 340
224 In addition to the nine formed police units, there are more than thirty infantry units of varying sizes
deployed throughout Haiti.
225 United Nations Map No. 4224, Rev 23. MINUSTAH. (United Nations Department of Field Support,
Cartographic Section, March 2009). Despite multiple requests, the United Nations Cartographic Office did
not provide the author with historical mission maps that allow for the examination of the initial MINUSTAH
force structure. Current maps, however, are suitable for this analysis as they reflect various types of
personnel that China could theoretically contribute.
226 Ibid.
227 Napoli, 2007: 46-47.
228s United Nations Map No. 4224, Rev 23. (United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic
Section, March 2009).




support and utility helicopters. 2 30 Logistical difficulties associated with a long-range
deployment as well as a lack of English language skills could complicate or hamper an
aviation deployment.231 If deployed to Haiti, Chinese aircraft would be operating in
airspace crowded with civilian and military aircraft, requiring Chinese military aircrews to
communicate in English, the universal language of aviation. Complications or potential
mishaps stemming from poor communication could potentially tarnish China's image as a
well-trained and disciplined troop contributor. These limitations offer China few options
other than either contributing an infantry or formed police unit. China has not yet
contributed infantry forces to a UN operation; doing so could potentially generate
concerns of a China threat, particularly if they were deployed to the Caribbean, a region
thought to be well within the US sphere of influence. Critics have previously applied the
"China threat" concept to Chinese peacekeeping efforts 232
The presence of nine formed police units suggests that the OMA force requirement
called for at least that many units. If the argument that China uses its deployment of
personnel to MINUSTAH to influence Haiti's diplomatic actions holds true, it is certainly
surprising that China did not try to build a larger presence by filling the additional formed
police unit requirements.
Findings and Predictions
China's contribution of nearly 1000 civilian police officers to MINUSTAH over
the course of four years demonstrates China's willingness to participate in peace
230 The Military Balance 2009. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009): 382-387.
231 China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping (New York: International Crisis Group, 2009): 7. Interviews
of UN officials conducted by the International Crisis Group reveal that the English language skills of
Chinese peacekeepers is limited and hampers planning and meetings.232 See Yin, 2007: 61 for a summary of cases where the China Threat theory has been applied to Chinese
peace operation participation.
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operations in states where the potential economic gain is greatly outweighed by political
benefits. This is evident in the number of Chinese personnel deployed to MINUSTAH.
The cumulative total of Chinese police officers deployed to Haiti between June 2004 and
December 2008 is the fifth largest contribution of Chinese personnel to a UN mission,
behind contributions to missions in Liberia, the Congo, Sudan, and Lebanon. 233 The case
of Haiti clearly demonstrates how the desire for an enhanced diplomatic position can drive
China's peace operation participation. The deployment of a relatively large Chinese force
despite the lack of any other apparent Chinese economic, strategic, or commercial interest
in Haiti supports the theory that China analyzes potential peace operations on a case-by-
case basis where one driver alone can shape China's participation.
China's participation in MINUSTAH offers some predictive power for Chinese
behavior in future peace operations. China's relatively large commitment of peace
operations forces to gain what appears to be coercive diplomatic influence in a state that
maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan demonstrates Beijing's willingness to use peace
operations forces as a diplomatic tool. Although the states that maintain diplomatic ties
with Taiwan are all relatively stable, China would potentially deploy a symbolic peace
operations contingent if deteriorating conditions led to the establishment of a UN peace
operation there.
Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic
China's contribution of an FPU to Haiti represents a mission where China's peace
operation participation was guided by a desire to make a political statement and gain
diplomatic access in a state that maintains ties with Taiwan. While the Haitian case
identifies diplomatic and political drivers behind China's peace operation participation, it
233 China 's National Defense in 2008.
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does not analyze potential commercial and economic motivations. A comparative case
study that examines China's significant personnel contributions in the United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) vis-
A-vis the absence of Chinese participation in the UN Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) provides insight into the more realist commercial and
economic drivers of Chinese peacekeeping. The comparative case study provides context
to the relationship between China's peace operations contributions and both oil reserves
and trade in a peace operation host state that was identified by the regression analysis in
chapter five. It also provides more detailed analysis of economic and commercial issues
than the brief overviews in the medium-N chapter. Additionally, this case study relies on a
method of difference analysis to determine what factors led China to contribute forces in
Sudan, but not in neighboring Chad or the Central African Republic.
Sudan Mission Background
The United Nations currently maintains two peacekeeping operations in Sudan.
The first, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was founded following the adoption of UN
Security Council Resolution 1547 in June 2004. The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAMID) was initially launched by the African Union, but came under the auspices of
the United Nations in July 2007 through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution
1769.
UNMIS was established with the initial mandate of preparing for a peace support
mission that would be deployed following the signing of a Comprehensive Peace
Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation
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Movement/Army (SPLM/A).234 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in
January 2005, was meant to end the two-decade long Second Civil Sudanese War between
the GoS and the SPLM/A. While a complete description of the conflict is beyond the
scope of this thesis, the war stemmed from a variety of factors including ethnic and
religious issues, allocation of resource wealth, and control over arable land.235 Shortly
after the CPA was signed, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1590, which shifted
the UNMIS mandate to supporting the implementation of the CPA by monitoring the
implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the GoS and the SPLM/A, monitoring
the movement and redeployment of forces, assisting in the implementation of a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program, and helping to restructure
various components of the post-conflict government in Sudan.236
The United Nations Security Council formally approved UNAMID on 31 July
2007 with the goal of bringing stability to the western Sudanese region of Darfur. Since
2003, the region has been plagued by an ethnically motivated armed conflict over land
resources.237 The Sudanese government has been accused of allying with African-Arab
militias in carrying out crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur.238 The mission is
tasked primarily with the protection of civilians, but also contributes to security for
humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying the implementation of agreements,
234 UN Mission in Sudan Mission Background. United Nations. Available
Online:<http://www.unmis.org/english/background.htm>.
235 A variety of books describe the conflict in Sudan including, Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern
Sudan. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
236 "Resolution 1590". S/RES/1590 (2005). United Nations Security Council. 24 March 2005.
237 G6rard Prunier offers a readable and complete history of the crisis in Darfur in Darfur: A 2 1"t Century
Genocide (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008)
238 Ibid, 99-110.
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assisting the development of an inclusive political process, and monitoring and reporting
on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.2 39
China's Peacekeeping Participation in Sudan
China has contributed large numbers of forces to both missions in Sudan. Between
April 2005 and December 2008, China contributed 1875 troops, civilian police, and
military observers to UNMIS, and deployed another 422 troops and observers to
UNAMID between November 2007 and December 2008. Combined, this represents the
second largest Chinese deployment of peace operations personnel to a given country,
behind the contribution of over 4000 peacekeepers to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
between October 2003 and December 2008.240 The Chinese troop contribution to UNMIS
consists of one engineering unit of roughly 275 personnel, one Level II medical hospital
manned by 60 Chinese personnel, and one 100-man transportation unit.241 China has also
contributed a total of 47 civilian police officers to UNMIS.242 In UNAMID, China
deployed an engineering company and a transportation unit.243 At the end of 2008, China
was the second largest non-African contributor to UNAMID and the forth-largest non-
African contributor to UNMIS. 244 The Chinese troops in Sudan have reportedly
239 UNAMID: African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur-Background. United Nations.
2008. Available online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html>.
240 China's National Defense in 2008, Appendix III.
241 E-mail correspondence with Chinese military officers assigned to the Permanent Mission of China to the
United Nations, 15 April 2008. A Level-II hospital provides advanced life support, basic surgery, and
intensive care. It may be supported by a laboratory and radiology facility, and is generally required in
regions where there is no ready access to modem hospital facilities. Source: Benjamin Seet, "Levels of
medical support for United Nations peacekeeping operations," Military Medicine (July 1999).
242 China's National Defense in 2008, Appendix III.
243 E-mail correspondence with Chinese military officers assigned to the Permanent Mission of China to the
United Nations, 15 April 2008. Also, UN Map No 4327, Rev 3. UNAMID Mission Map. (UN Department
of Field Support, January 2009).
244 UNMission Contributions by Country. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 31 December 2008.
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demonstrated high levels of performance and have been awarded certificates of merit and
unit citations and UNMIS senior leadership. 245
Like its participation in MINUSTAH, China claimed that its contributions to the
missions in Sudan were the result of United Nations requests.246 As previously discussed,
the United Nations Office of Military Affairs typically does not request contributions from
specific troop contributing nations. Instead, China likely responded to a general request
for forces, indicating that China elected to participate in the missions in Sudan. Chinese
officials also issued the same general explanation for participation that is generally
provided before China deploys personnel to any UN mission, stating that China supports
UN peacekeeping missions and seeks to help promote peace and stability in Sudan.247
However, given China's considerable commercial interests in Sudan, it seems unlikely
that Beijing's decision to contribute such a sizeable peacekeeping contingent was driven
by pure altruism.
Much media and policy interest concerning China's peacekeeping participation
and interaction with Sudan focuses on the involvement of China's growing investment in
underdeveloped resource-rich states, like Sudan, which are often governed by regimes that
the West does not approve of.24 8 Much of this attention paints China as a mercantilist actor
that uses state power and resources to enhance the ability of Chinese firms to access
Sudan's resource wealth. Numerous non-governmental organizations have protested
China's commercial relations with Sudan, believing that China's desire to maintain close
245 "Chinese Peacekeepers in Sudan Honored for Prominent Performance," Xinhua as reported by BBC
Worldwide Monitoring. 13 September 2007.
246 "China to join UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan," Xinhua as reported by BBC Worldwide
Monitoring. 30 March 2005.
247 Ibid.
248 China 's Thirst for Oil. (New York: International Crisis Group, 2008), 12.
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commercial ties may lead China to downplay the Government of Sudan's role in the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur, which has displaced 2.5 million and killed 300,000
people.249 These criticisms are not unfounded given the extent of Chinese investment in
Sudan's oil sector.
China's Commercial Involvement in Sudan
In 1959, Sudan became the fourth African nation to diplomatically recognize
Beijing. The two nations have generally maintained good relations despite shifts in the
government in Khartoum. Between 1959 and 1989, China was one of Sudan's many
diplomatic partners, and while not playing a significant role in Sudan's foreign relations,
the two nations developed trade, aid, cultural, political, and military links, many of which
remain in place today.250 China continued to maintain relations with Sudan following the
June 1989 military coup that placed Omar Hassan al-Bashir in power. In 1994, the
Government of Sudan expressed interest in Chinese development of Sudan's oil sector. 25 1
Two years later, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) won its
first tender for an oil extraction project in Sudan.252 In 1998, China began construction of
the Khartoum Refinery, a joint venture with the Sudanese Ministry of Energy and
Mining. 25 3 China's involvement in Sudan's oil sector continued to grow with CNPC
taking on additional roles in oilfield services, engineering, and construction, including
building and maintaining a 1,506-kilometer oil pipeline linking the Heglig Oilfield to Port
249 "U.N.: 100,000 more dead in Darfur than reported," CNN.com/World. 22 April 2008. Available online:
<http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/04/22/darfur.holmes/index.html>.
250 Daniel Large, "From Non-Interference to Constructive Engagement? China's Evolving Relations With
Sudan," in China Returns to Africa, Chris Alden, et al, eds (London: Hurst, 2008), 276-277.
251 Ibid, 278.




Sudan.254 In August 1999, Sudan became an oil exporter, thanks in large part to Chinese
development of oil fields and pipelines. 255 Since then, China has expanded its oil
extraction presence in Sudan, and by 2000, petroleum products amounted to ninety-eight
percent of Sudan's exports to China.256 By 2002, nine-percent of all Chinese oil imports
came from Sudan. 257 China's economic and commercial ties with Sudan continued after
the signing of the CPA, with China gaining access to additional oil concessions in 2005
and 2007.258
China's participation in Sudan's oil sector differs significantly from that of most
other multinational energy corporations. CNPC has stated that security of China's energy
supply trumps company interests, meaning that corporate policy may seek to secure access
to international oil reserves and not necessarily profits. 259 As a state-owned firm carrying
out state objectives, CNPC can pursue high-risk investments that many other multinational
firms would avoid.2 60 Additionally, the strategic nature of CNPC's mission in Sudan has
led China to use state power and resources to reinforce ties with Khartoum Indeed, China
has demonstrated this mercantilist approach in Sudan as its involvement in the oil sector
has been combined with humanitarian aid, military assistance, and preferential loan
agreements.261 For instance, China's Export-Import (Exim) Bank offered reduced rate
loans to the Bank of Sudan to help fuel development and construction in the oil sector. 262
254 Ibid.
255 Large 2008, 280. Also, "CNPC in Sudan."
256 Large 2008, 285.
257 Large 2008, 280.
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259 "China Lines Up Oil Deals Far Afield," The Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition). 19 December 2003.
cited in Luke A. Patey, The Strategic Behaviour of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in
Sudan. (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies: 2006).
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Explaining China's Participation in Sudan
Despite China's stated agenda of deploying peacekeepers to promote peace and
stability in Sudan, many of Beijing's dealings with Khartoum enhance Sudan's ability to
wage war, both materially and politically. China vocally advocates for international
respect of Sudan's sovereignty, blocking sanctions that could cut the oil profits which
support the Sudanese government and criticizing moves to prosecute Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir for genocide.263 China also provides advanced weaponry, including
ground attack aircraft, and military training to the Sudanese armed forces.264 At the same
time, China commits large numbers of troops, observers, and police officers to missions
aimed at ending civil war and domestic strife, resulting in a strategic dichotomy in which
Beijing appears to simultaneously promote both peace and war. China's continued
political, financial, and military support for the Government of Sudan despite international
condemnation for Sudan's acts raises questions about Beijing's idealist justification for its
contribution to UNMIS and UNAMID.
Given China's significant stake in Sudan's oil industry, it is clear that Beijing
wants to ensure that its flow of oil from Sudan continues uninterrupted. The presence of
large oil reserves increases Sudan's strategic value to China, and therefore provides a set
of intrinsic interests and private goods for China to access and protect. The question
remaining to be answered is what specific causal factors lead China to deploy
peacekeeping forces to Sudan. While Beijing seeks to protect its access to Sudan's oil by
deploying peacekeeping forces, does China contribute forces to physically protect its oil
263 Peter Walker and Julian Borger, "China may veto attempt to arrest Sudanese president on genocide
charges," The Guardian (UK). 15 July 2008.264 Hilary Andersson, "China is 'fuelling war in Darfur,"' BBC News. 13 July 2008. Available online:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7503428.stm>.
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infrastructure? Does it deploy to provide a stable environment in which oil extraction can
continue? Or, does China support and participate in peace operations to ensure the
international community does not enact further sanctions that could block its access to
Sudan's oil?
The first potential motivation behind China's deployments to UNMIS and
UNAMID is the "physical protection" mechanism. This mechanism posits that China
deploys its forces to physically protect Chinese oil infrastructure in Sudan. China has
significant oil interests spread throughout the country, with Chinese investment in eight of
Sudan's twenty-three oil concession blocks.26 5 This infrastructure has previously been
attacked by Sudanese rebel groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),
which labeled China as "a partner for [the] genocidal government in Khartoum." 266 The
rebel group has demanded that China withdraw its support for the Sudanese government,
arguing that oil revenues benefit the Sudanese government rather than the people of
Sudan. JEM leadership say that attacks against oil facilities are used to coerce Chinese
firms into leaving Sudan.267 Chinese-owned oil facilities have reportedly been attacked
and seized on multiple occasions, potentially providing China with a desire to physically
protect its oil infrastructure.
While China could potentially use the forces it has deployed to Sudan to protect its
oil infrastructure, the "physical protection" mechanism seems unlikely on a number of
grounds. First, the voluntary nature of personnel contributions to UN peace operations
265 Oil Map of Sudan. European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. 2007. Available online:
<http://www.ecosonline.org>.
266 6"Rebels tell China 'leave Sudan,"' BBC News. 25 October 2007. Available online:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7061066.stm>.
267 "Sudan rebels 'attack oil field,"' BBC News. 11 December 2007. Available online:
<http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/africa/7 138226.stm>.
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allows contributing nations to withdraw their forces at any time, however China will
probably not redeploy its troops in Sudan to defend oil infrastructure. China has not
deployed combat arms units, such as infantry troops, to Sudan that would be capable of
protecting oil fields and other facilities from attacks by relatively well-armed rebels
equipped with rocket propelled grenades and machine guns. 268 Instead, it has contributed
engineering, medical, and transportation units, which have specific supporting roles in
UNMIS and UNAMID, and are poorly suited and equipped for physical protection
missions. Second, the Sudanese Armed Forces seem to provide security for most oil
related infrastructure. News reports indicate that 1200 government troops helped defend a
Chinese-run oil facility in the Kordofan state of Sudan before it was allegedly overrun by
JEM rebels, and the Sudanese army assigns troops to protect high risk oil facilities,
including facilities in concession blocks where China's CNPC maintains significant
shares. 2 69 These guards are often armed with weapons and equipment provided by
China.270 The security guarantees provided by the GoS offers more security than could be
provided by the few hundred non-combat troops China has deployed. Given the lack of
Chinese combat capabilities in Sudan and the use of GoS forces to protect oil
infrastructure, the proximity of Chinese deployments to oil extraction sites, as described in
the medium-N analysis, does not necessarily correlate with a desire to use Chinese forces
to protect oil interests. Furthermore, the large swaths of Sudan that fall into oil concession
blocks makes it difficult to distinguish if the proximity of Chinese deployments to oil
268 Media reports often describe rocket and grenade attacks carried out by rebels in Sudan.
269 Ibid. Also, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights (Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 2003): 284.270 Hilary Andersson, "China is 'fuelling war in Darfur,"' BBC News. 13 July 2008. Available online:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7 503428.stm>.
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fields is coincidental. In light of this evidence, the physical protection mechanism is
likely not they key driver for China's contribution to the mission in Sudan.
A second potential driver for China's personnel contributions is the "continued
access" mechanism. This mechanism suggests that China's contributions to UNMIS and
UNAMID were intended to ensure continued political access to Sudan's oil supply. That
is, China hoped to prevent potential sanctions that could block its continued legal access to
Sudanese oil by reassuring the international community that Sudan was becoming a more
responsible actor due to Khartoum's acceptance of two United Nations peace operations.
Significant evidence points to the continued access mechanism and suggests that
upper levels of the Chinese government encouraged the mission to ensure that China
would be able to maintain its Sudanese oil flow. To demonstrate its support for peace in
Sudan, the Chinese ambassador to the UN helped broker a compromise plan that called for
an enhanced UN peacekeeping role in Darfur during a November 2006 conference in
Addis Ababa.2 71 Shortly after the conference in Adidas Ababa, China's ambassador to the
United Nations, Wang Guanya said, "Usually China doesn't send messages, but this time
they did. It was a clear strong message that the proposal from Kofi Annan is a good one
and Sudan has to accept it." 272 This demonstrates a significant departure from China's
traditional behavior of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, signaling
the importance that China placed on ensuring the presence of a peace operation in Sudan.
Interestingly, despite advocating for a UN force in Darfur, China abstained from
voting on Resolution 1706 which authorized the extension of UNMIS peacekeeping force
into Darfur. China abstained from voting as it believed that implementing the resolution
271 Large, 2008: 289.
272 "China told Sudan to adopt UN's Darfur plan - envoy," Bloomberg. 7 February 2007.
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without ensuring that the mission came with the "consent of the Government of National
Unity" could lead to further confrontation and potentially endanger the implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 273 However, China voted in support of Resolution
1769 on 31 July 2007, which officially authorized the UNAMID force. Not coincidentally,
China's last day of the rotating presidency of the Security Council was 31 July 2007.
China reportedly used its influence to ensure the resolution's passing. 274 China's efforts to
make the mission mandate more politically acceptable to the Sudanese government is a
clear reflection of Beijing's desire to portray itself as a responsible actor while also
appealing to the Government of Sudan.
The timing of China's calls for Sudan also seems to be quite calculated. China
went to great lengths to promote its responsible role over Sudan in the months leading up
to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. In response to China's ties with Sudan, many activist
groups called for boycotts of the Beijing games. These boycotts could have damaged
China's reputation.275 The added attention surrounding China in the months leading up to
the Olympics resulted in increased scrutiny and international condemnation of China's
seemingly unwavering support for the Government of Sudan, which could have led to
sanctions on Sudanese oil on top of potential boycotts of the Olympic games. These
actions would have damaged China's national pride and its energy security.
China's peacekeeping participation in Sudan can be viewed as a component of a
broader Chinese government agenda to secure continued access to Sudanese oil.
Peacekeeping is only one component of a spectrum of Chinese government involvement
in Sudan that includes investment, construction assistance, preferential rate loans, military
273 UN Security Council Document S/PV.5519 31 August 2006.
274 Large, 2008: 290.
275 Ibid: 290.
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assistance, and humanitarian aid. This assistance paints China as a mercantilist actor in
Sudan, using various elements of state power to enhance ties with the Sudanese
government. Although China's involvement with Sudan is multifaceted, some policy
analysis claims that a lack of coordination between the different arms of the Chinese
government apparatus has prevented peacekeeping and overseas investment efforts from
strategically converging. 276 This certainly does not appear to be the case with China's
participation in Sudan where officials in Beijing have gone against China's policy of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states to strongly encourage peace operations
in Sudan in order to counter significant criticism from the international community over
its oil investment in Sudan.
China's support and personnel contributions for UN missions in Sudan appear to
have two intended goals in securing continued access to Sudanese oil. First, by publically
supporting peace operations in Sudan, China portrayed itself as a responsible global actor
while also encouraging Sudan to accept a UN peacekeeping mission. This action may
have prevented calls for sanctions on Sudanese oil exports that could have endangered
China's energy security and damaged China's status in the months prior to the 2008
Beijing Olympics. Second, supporting peace operations in Sudan may have been intended
to appease Darfurian rebel groups who viewed China as a primary enemy due to its close
relationship with the Government of Sudan. While China has been largely successful at
preventing sanctions that could block its access to Sudan's oil, it has failed at winning
over rebel opinion, as groups such as JEM still view China as supporting the Sudanese
government's war against them.277
276 China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, 2009: 16.
277 "Sudan rebels 'attack oil field,"' BBC News. 11 December 2007.
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The continued access mechanism demonstrates a realist motivation for China's
support and personnel contributions to UNMIS and UNAMID. China used its government
influence in the United Nations and the deployment of Chinese military and police
personnel to ensure its petroleum companies could continue operating in Sudan. Chinese
leaders, however, strongly deny that China is a mercantilist actor, with Premier Wen
Jiabao publically stating that, "Neo-colonialism is not a label for China."278 China claims
that its diplomatic and commercial involvement in Africa is "win-win" in nature,
benefiting both China and developing African nations. 279 It views its participation as a
means of assisting African development. 280 Despite these claims, many Africans,
including some in Sudan, argue that China's participation is not win-win and actually
damages local economies by flooding markets with cheap Chinese products and by
exploiting African workers. 28 1 Regardless of whether Chinese investment and interaction
benefits African nations, it demonstrates China's mercantilist behavior in which it uses
state resources to gain commercial access to African nations.
The Case ofMINURCAT
While Chinese forces were deployed to Sudan in relatively large numbers, Beijing
chose not to deploy any personnel to the United Nations operation in neighboring Chad
and the Central African Republic. The United Nations Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was established by Security Council Resolution 1778
in September 2007 in response to "the activities of armed groups and other attacks in
278 Zong He, "Some Observations in Response to 'China Threat in Africa,"' China Foreign Affairs Journal
85 (Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, December 2008). Available online:
<http://www.cpifa.org/en/Html/20081223345557-1.html>.
279 "China-Africa Economic Cooperation to Be Win-Win," Xinhua. 30 April 2006.280 Zong, 2008.
281 Shapi Shacinda, "African workers now resent Chinese influx," Reuters. 13 August 2006.
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eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and western Sudan which
threaten the security of the civilian population, the conduct of humanitarian operations in
those areas and the stability of those countries." 282 This instability stemmed largely from a
spillover of the conflict in Darfur, as Sudanese rebels attacked Darfurian refugees seeking
sanctuary in Chad and the Central African Republic. The MINUCAT mandate tasked the
mission with helping to create security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and
sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons by training the Chadian police and
security forces, relocating refugee camps that are close to the border, liaising with various
governments and regional organizations, and assisting the governments of Chad and the
Central African Republic promote rule of law and human rights.283
The European Union (EU) supported the creation of a peace operation aimed at
improving the security of refugees and displaced persons, and pledged to provide
additional forces to the mission.284 As a result, the United Nations, acting under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized the EU to deploy forces and take all
necessary measures to improve the security environment in eastern Chad and the north-
eastern Central African Republic. 285 Thus, the military observers and police deployed
under the MINURCAT mandate were to be supported by over 4000 troops from the EU.
The European Union Force (EUFOR) and MINURCAT are two separate organizations,
but operate under the same Security Council Resolution. While MINURCAT concentrates
its efforts on strengthening governance and security institutions in Chad and the Central
282 "Resolution 1778" S/RES/1778 (2007). United Nations Security Council. 25 September 2007.
283 "Resolution 1778."
284 UN Security Council Document S/2007/560. 21 September 2007.
285 "Resolution 1778."
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African Republic, EUFOR is an armed force tasked with preventing rebel incursions from
Sudan and protecting refugee camps.286
Despite having the opportunity to contribute forces to MINURCAT, China elected
not to do so, making MINURCAT the only current UN mission in Africa without Chinese
participation. While the mission mandate for MINURCAT called for fewer personnel than
the mandates for either UNMIS and UNAMID, offering China fewer opportunities to
participate, the mission requirement of up to 350 police and observers in Chad and the
Central African Republic has never been fully filled, leaving China the ability to
contribute personnel to the mission. Additionally, Chinese media reported that the EU
consulted with potential third party contributors, suggesting that the EU would allow non-
members to contribute forces to EUFOR.2 87 It is unlikely, however, that China would
submit large contingents of its personnel to EU command, even if given the opportunity to
do so. While China has deployed troops to UN missions with non-Chinese mission
commanders, China avoids participating in non-UN operations. For instance, China chose
not to participate in any of the multinational missions carrying out anti-piracy operations
in the Gulf of Aden stating that China would not accept assignments from "other regional
organizations or countries." 288 As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China
has a level of influence over mission mandates that it likely would not have if it
participated in an operation planned largely by a non-UN force. Even though EUFOR
operated under the auspices of a UN mandate, the mandate was very broad in scope,
286 "Chad: Dual peacekeeping mission seeks to dispel confusion," UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs. 11 January 2008. Available online:
<http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=76196>.
287 "EU Council adopts military action in Chad, Central African Republic," People's Daily. 16 October
2007. Available online: <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/6283804.html>.
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authorizing the EU to take any actions necessary to enhance regional security. As a non-
EU member, China would likely have little say in the planning of the EUFOR mission and
would likely be forced to accept EU decisions if it participated. While the conditions for
contributing large numbers of forces to the EU mission were not ideal, China could have
contributed observers or police to the MINURCAT mission.
A Comparison of Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic
The lack of Chinese participation in MINURCAT is surprising given that
conditions in at least one of the mission countries, Chad, have some commonalities with
mission countries where China has contributed peace operations personnel. The two most
apparent similarities between Chad and other peace operations host states are the presence
of resource wealth and Chad's diplomatic switch in August 2006 in which it shifted its
diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing. The diplomatic switch alone may have warranted
Chinese contributions to the state as it presented Beijing with 289 The differences that exist
between Chad and Sudan likely play some role in China's decision to not contribute
forces.
While oil is present in both Chad and Sudan, proven oil reserves in 2006, the year
prior to the launch of both UNAMID and MINURCAT, are far higher in Sudan (6.6
billion barrels) than in Chad (900 million barrels). 290 Additionally, China's investment in
Sudan's oil sector in 2006 was significantly greater than in Chad. While China maintained
significant extraction agreements in Sudan and was invested in multiple oil fields and
facilities, China's oil interests in Chad were limited to technical services such as
289 Large, 2008: 290. Large suggests that Beijing's new diplomatic ties with Chad may have increased the
importance of regional stability, but viewed the new diplomatic ties as a potential driver of Chinese support
for peace operations in neighboring Sudan.
290 Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, British Petroleum, 2008.
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geophysical prospecting, well drilling and logging in one oil field.2 91 The lack of
significant existing oil infrastructure agreements with Chad may have led China to decide
against deploying personnel there. Despite a potential interest in regional stability, China
may have viewed its contributions to the missions in Sudan as sufficient given the lack of
a vested interest in protecting oil flows from Chad to China. Some analysts believe that
China may invest in Chad's nascent oil industry and possibly link the countries oilfields to
Sudan via a pipeline, allowing for exports by sea.29 2 Additional investment in Chad's oil
industry could potentially lead to Chinese contributions to MINURCAT.
Another factor not present in Sudan was international pressure for China to take
action. The mission in Chad and the Central African Republic was aimed largely at
protecting Darfurian refugees and local civilians from attacks by Sudanese rebels. This
differed substantially from the missions in Sudan, particularly UNAMID, where the
Sudanese government and its proxies were accused of attacking civilians within the
country's borders, often with weapons provided by China. Many international activists
viewed China as a mercantilist actor concerned purely with maintaining its access to
Sudan's oil wealth with little regard for the humanitarian crisis. Given the lack of
significant oil investment in Chad and the Central African Republic, China could not be
viewed as a mercantilist power in those states, and therefore did not receive the same
global pressure to participate.
Comparing factors such as Chinese foreign direct investment and Chinese trade
with Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic would provide little additional
291 Soares de Oliveira, 2008: 94.
292 Thomas Pearmain, "Chad Chooses China; Future of Chad's Energy Sector Likely to Change
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analytical value because China's FDI and trade flows with Sudan consist largely of oil
related investment and exchanges. Absent significant oil extraction agreements in the
Central African Republic and Chad, FDI and trade flows in these states remain far lower
than they are in Sudan. Variation in levels of FDI and trade flows between China and the
three African states can therefore be considered the result of China's oil investment in
Sudan, and cannot be analyzed independent of this fact.
Findings
China's peacekeeping participation in Sudan demonstrates a case where China
contributed personnel to ensure continued access to a critical strategic resource. The
deployment of Chinese personnel does not appear as if it were meant to physically defend
Chinese-invested oil facilities, but rather to ensure that political conditions, both
internationally and within Sudan, would allow for continued oil exports to China.
Peacekeeping participation in Sudan appears to be one component of a broader
government objective of maintaining both international and Sudanese support, and
demonstrates a realist set of drivers for China's participation.
While the potential presence of oil reserves and the recent diplomatic shift in Chad
should have made MINURCAT an attractive contributing opportunity for China, Beijing
chose not to participate in the mission. This suggests that one of the drivers behind
China's contributions to the missions in Sudan but not to MINRCAT is the presence of
existing oil extraction agreements as opposed to potential future extraction. Additionally,
the high profile nature of the case in Sudan and international criticism of China's
mercantilist involvement in Sudan prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics may have
encouraged China's contributions there but not to the mission in neighboring Chad and the
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Central African Republic, which had garnered less media attention due to the lack of
significant Chinese commercial investment and government human rights offenses in
those countries.
Conclusion
The two sets of case studies presented in this thesis offer insight into the calculus
that may drive China's contributions to peace operations. China's deployment of a formed
police unit to MINUSTAH represents a case where China used its state resources to make
a political statement and exert limited diplomatic influence over a state that maintains ties
with Taiwan, even in the absence of any extractable goods in the peace operation host
state. Despite the lack of natural resources or potential markets, Haiti is strategically
important to China because it is one of few remaining states that do not recognize the
People's Republic of China. The mission was also China's first peacekeeping deployment
to the Americas, signaling that China no longer confines itself to operating in regions not
dominated by western actors.
China's substantial personnel contributions to the missions in Sudan are cases
where China participates in peace operations that enable it to secure access to strategically
important resources. The deployment of Chinese forces and China's public support for
UNMIS and UNAMID allow China to portray itself as a responsible actor concerned
about stability in Sudan, thereby downplaying the view of China as a mercantilist actor
that disregards the human suffering in Sudan. This is very much a realist move as China's
encouragement for Sudan to accept a peacekeeping force potentially reduces the
likelihood of additional sanctions that could cut off China's ability to legally obtain
Sudanese oil. At the same time, China's deployments and its willingness to use its position
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in the UN Security Council to ensure that missions do not severely infringe upon Sudan's
sovereignty likely improve Beijing's position with Khartoum.
In both cases, China used participation in peace operations to further its own
interests, suggesting a policy guided by realist drivers aimed at enhancing China's access




As China progresses along its path of economic and diplomatic development,
Chinese decision makers will likely continue to use participation in peace operations as a
means of furthering China's commercial and diplomatic interests, while at the same time,
pursuing an image of a responsible actor committed to ensuring stability and international
peace. These dual objectives offer China the opportunity to play a larger role in
international institutions, something expected from world powers, while following a
largely realpolitik foreign policy aimed at enhancing China's access to critically important
natural resources and diplomatic partners.
The triangulation research design used in this thesis helps compensate for a small
universe of cases. While slightly unorthodox in nature, the methodology allows for
analysis of trends and potential causal mechanisms, and examines details that can only be
revealed in case studies. The first and most general component of the design, statistical
analysis, reveals trends that support a hypothesis that Chinese forces tend to contribute
higher levels of forces in states with higher strategic values. That is, a mission in a peace
operation host state rich in resources, with high levels of trade with China, or that is
geographically near China, will be composed of a higher percentage of Chinese forces
than states with lower strategic values. Admittedly the sample size, which is never larger
than 76 mission-countries, is far smaller than number of cases generally associated with
large-N studies. However the statistical analysis revealed trends that led to closer
examination in the medium-N component of the thesis.
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Using a largely qualitative approach that relies on examining observable
implications of potential strategic drivers behind China's peacekeeping participation, the
medium-N study generally supported the findings of the statistical analysis. The medium-
N analysis examine variation in the subset of the twenty-two missions where China has
contributed personnel, and found a weak relationship between the type of forces China
deployed to a peace operation host state and the total number of observable implications in
that state. Observable implications included a variety of indicators such as the presence of
oil extraction agreements, high level diplomatic exchanges, and foreign direct investment.
China generally deployed troops to missions in states with higher numbers of total
observable implications, which can interpreted as states with a higher strategic value.
China generally deployed smaller contingents of military observers and civilian police in
cases that did not exhibit large numbers of observable implications. The study also
revealed three notable findings that did not emerge in the statistical analysis. First, the
study identified that China primarily deployed military observers prior to 2000, while the
contribution of troops began in the 2000s. The one notable outlier to this trend is China's
deployment of engineering troops to Cambodia in 1993. This deployment, however, can
be justified by the close proximity of Cambodia to the Chinese mainland. Second, the
medium-N study finds that there are greater numbers of observable implications
associated with missions where China begins its participation after 2000 than in cases
where China launches its participation prior to 2000. This suggests that strategic drivers
behind Chinese deployments may begin playing a role in the early 2000s, which
corresponds with China's first large scale deployment of troops on peace operations
outside of Asia. Third, the medium-N study reveals two significant outliers to the post-
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2000 trends in Chinese deployments. Both deployments are to host states with low
strategic values, based on the number of observable implications, yet include relatively
sizeable deployments. While a case study reveals that diplomatic, and not economic,
interests drove China to participate in Haiti, it is remains largely unclear why China
deployed a large contingent of troops to Lebanon, although China may have increased its
participation in Lebanon after one of its observers was killed in July 2006.
The third component of the triangulation method features two sets of case studies.
The first is an individual case study of China's participation in the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), while the second set of case studies is a comparative
analysis of China's participation in the two UN missions in Sudan and China's non-
participation in the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).
These cases were selected as they are outliers that are considerably different from China's
participation in other peace operations.
The first case study finds that China deployed a formed police unit to Haiti, a
country with a low strategic value to China, in an attempt to gain limited diplomatic
leverage over one of the few states that continues to recognize the Republic of China. The
case study also examines why China deployed a heavily armed formed police unit to Haiti
instead of a civilian police unit or an enabling military unit such as a transportation,
medical, or engineering company, as they have traditionally done. UN documentation and
historical analysis reveal that there was no requirement for traditional civilian police in
MINUSTAH and that troop contributing nations from the Western Hemisphere already
occupied most of the roles that China typically fills in peace operations, leaving China to
choose between sending contributing a formed police unit, infantry, or aviation. China has
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never contributed infantry or aviation forces to a peace operation, and Chinese concerns
about providing fodder for westerners who support a China threat theory would have
surely prevented the deployment of an infantry or military aviation unit into America's
backyard.
The second set of case studies examines China's significant personnel
contributions to missions in Sudan compared to China's non-participation in the United
Nations mission in neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic. The case studies
find that China's commercial ties with Sudan are far greater than those with either Chad or
the Central African Republic. The analysis argues that China's support for UNMIS and
UNAMID help Beijing paint an image of itself as a responsible international actor instead
of a mercantilist power, while at the same time ensuring its continued access to Sudanese
oil wealth.
The findings of this thesis generally support the theory that China is a realist and
potentially mercantilist actor, whose contributions to peace operations appear to be driven
by a desire to further Beijing's commercial and diplomatic interests. The findings also
suggest a shift in the drivers behind China's peace operations participation, which may tell
a broader story about China's foreign policy interests. Prior to 2000, China generally
deployed small contingents of military observers and civilian police to nations that had a
low strategic value to China. The lack of a sizeable Chinese force on the ground along
with the minimal strategic value of most pre-2000 peace operation host states suggests that
China was not motivated by a desire to secure access to resources or influence host state
policies. Instead, China contributed personnel primarily to observer missions where
Beijing could demonstrate its commitment to global stability and international institutions,
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perhaps in an attempt to rebuild its reputation, and potentially the PLA's international
reputation, following the killing of civilians during the Tiananmen Square incident in June
1989.
In the early 2000s, China began contributing more forces including military units
and sizeable police contingents to missions distant from China. In the post-2000 period,
China has contributed forces to all but one of the ten missions launched since 2000. China
also began deploying forces to certain missions launched prior to 2000, where China had
not previously participated. Many of these missions were in states with proven oil reserves
or states where China had existing resource extraction and exploration agreements.
Additionally, all but three of the twelve missions China joined since 2000 were in Africa.
The increased participation of Chinese forces in Africa and in states with high strategic
values coincides with China's announcement of the "Going Out" policy and suggests that
the motivation behind China's participation in peace operations shifted to a more
realpolitik policy aimed at securing access to critical resources, gaining diplomatic
partners, and building spheres of influence. Current Chinese deployments reveal that any
one of these strategic drivers could lead China to contribute forces to a mission, and that
multiple drivers are not required to warrant a Chinese contribution. The deployment to
Haiti is a key example of this, as Haiti offers China no resources and only provides an
opportunity for China to exert influence over a state that recognizes Taipei rather than
Beijing.
While this thesis proposes that China's peace operations participation is driven by
a realpolitik calculus that supports Chinese foreign policy objectives, there are alternative
explanations for China's participation. The primary alternative explanation, which is
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commonly proclaimed by the Chinese government, supports an idealist argument by
suggesting that China participates for the purpose of promoting international stability.
While China's participation likely contributes to enhanced security in peace operation host
states, China's participation is clearly not driven solely by this ideational concept. If China
were driven entirely by a desire to be a benevolent actor, it should have participated in
more missions and should have been more receptive to demands by the United Nations to
contribute more resources, including infantry and aviation units, something China has not
done. China's idealist justification, however, could potentially be encompassed by the
realist explanation posited in this thesis. By claiming to be interested in promoting
international stability and by deploying forces to peace operations, China helps build its
image as a responsible actor, even if Beijing has additional motives for its contributions.
In turn, this enhanced image reinforces China's status as a responsible power in the
international community, a goal of decision makers in Beijing. 293 This enhanced status
serves China's diplomatic interests by placing it in a league alongside other "responsible
global actors."
Policy Implications
China's participation in UN peace operations represents Beijing's increased
willingness to more actively take part in international institutions. Although the motives
behind China's troop contributions may not be entirely altruistic, China's role in
supporting peace operations should not be condemned. Instead it should be supported.
Chinese participation provides the international community with an ideal venue in which
to engage China and help influence its military development. As described in an earlier
chapter, Chinese peacekeepers acquire operational lessons by working with their
293 China's proclaimed "Peaceful Development" concept supports this statement.
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international counterparts in peace operations. Officers practice their leadership
experiences and learn how to integrate military and civilian activities and police learn
alternative policing techniques from foreign police forces such as humane treatment and
the use of force.294 States participating in peace operations can share their techniques with
their Chinese counterparts. Additionally, states like the United Kingdom have already
taken the opportunity to help train Chinese peacekeepers in formal schools like China's
Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Center. Other UN members could follow the
British and offer training assistance that will not only make Chinese peacekeepers more
capable of carrying out their duties, but will also potentially influence the future
development of China's security institutions. Since Chinese peacekeepers are drawn from
the best police and military personnel, former peacekeepers may one day hold command
positions within their respective organizations. The lessons learned during peace
operations that they bring to their new positions in the Ministry of Public Security and the
PLA will help shape the future development of China's defense and security apparatus.
While China should be peacefully engaged, the international community must also
keep a close watch over China's peace operations to ensure that the presence of Chinese
peacekeepers helps to further peace instead of prolonging conflict. China's dual interests
in promoting peace while also securing access to critical resources and diplomatic
influence potentially leads to a conflict of interests. China has been criticized as a biased
actor that emboldens the actions of leaders of war-torn nations who ignore demands from
UN officials who believe that Chinese support allows them to act with impunity.295
294 Interviews with Chinese officials cited in International Crisis Group (2009), 14-15.
295 International Crisis Group, 16. President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ignored
demands from UN officials to act with restrain in the conflict in North Kivu after China signed a $9.25
billion deal for copper and cobalt with the DRC.
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China's participation in peace operations should be encouraged as long as a Chinese
presence helps contribute to enhanced stability and security.
Future Avenues for Research
The continuing rise of China's participation in peace operations, and more broadly,
in military operations other than war (MOOTW), allows for considerable future research
opportunities. Most current academic and policy examination of China's military
operations focuses on the PLA's development of advanced technologies and strategies that
could be employed in traditional conflicts such as a theater war in the Taiwan Straits or a
confrontation with the United States. This analysis tends to avoid studying smaller and
seemingly less exciting or significant MOOTW operations. Additional research in this
understudied area, however, is warranted, as China has demonstrated its increasing
willingness to employ military forces in non-traditional missions that support Chinese
interests in locales far from the Chinese periphery. Chinese MOOTW operations seem
more likely than large- scale conflict in today's security environment. Further research of
China's MOOTW participation may reveal trends in Chinese foreign policy or may allow
for analysis of Chinese military capabilities and operations.
Additional empirical research would undoubtedly build on the findings of this
thesis. This thesis illustrate a shift in the Chinese foreign policy drivers behind China's
peacekeeping participation from a policy aimed at improving its international reputation to
one with the goal of gaining commercial and political access in peace operation host
states. While the statistical and medium-N analysis offer a variety of tests for realist
explanatory variables, including those related to resource wealth, trade, and diplomatic
influence, they offer no empirical test of ideational explanations for China's participation
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in peace operations. Determining a robust and measureable indicator that could test the
idealist explanation would add to the value of future research.
Future research could also rely on methodology other than the triangulation
approach used in this thesis. While the methodology used in this thesis provides an
explanation for China's peace operations participation using data and empirical evidence
from government reports, press releases and secondary sources, alternative research
designs might allow for a more in-depth analysis. A research design that included
interviews with decision makers and practitioners in the Chinese government and
international organizations might provide greater insight into the relatively hidden
decision making process behind China's peace operations participation. While gaining
access to Chinese decision makers may prove difficult and their answers potentially
biased, such insight could better inform the findings of future research.
Final Thoughts
Ideally, this thesis offered an initial step toward explaining China's increasing
participation in peace operations. By doing so, it hopefully sheds light on issues far
broader in scope than the deployment of small numbers of peacekeeping forces. China's
participation in UN peace operations potentially tells a larger story about Beijing's
employment of military forces, China's view on access to strategically important states
and resources, and trends in Chinese foreign policy.
China's contributions to peace operations and other military operations other than
war are constantly changing, and China continues to develop as an ever more important
actor in the international community. Understanding the motivations behind China's
participation in peace operations must therefore be continually developed. An enhanced
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understanding in this relatively small field of study will provide academics, researchers,
and policymakers with deeper insight into Chinese foreign policy that may help to shape
future interaction with the People's Republic of China.
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